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The Multiplicity of Copyright Laws
on the Internet
Marketa Trimble*
ABSTRACT
From the early days of the Internet, commentators have warned that
it would be impossible for those who act on the Internet (“Internet actors”) to comply with the copyright laws of all Internet-connected countries if the national copyright laws of all those countries were to apply
simultaneously to Internet activity. A multiplicity of applicable copyright
laws seems plausible at least when the Internet activity is ubiquitous—
i.e., unrestricted by geoblocking or by other means—given the territoriality principle that governs international copyright law and either the lex
loci delicti or lex loci protectionis choice-of-law rules that countries
typically use for copyright infringements.
Commentators have advanced various proposals to eliminate this
multiplicity of applicable national copyright laws. Some experts have
called for a new and universal legal regime to govern the Internet that
would be distinct from the legal regimes of individual countries; this proposal would result in a single global copyright law that would govern all
Internet actors without regard to any particular national copyright laws.
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Other experts have suggested that the multiplicity be addressed by unifying national copyright laws and making the laws identical or almost
identical; this suggestion is another way to make a single set of copyright
law standards apply globally. Experts working at the intersection of intellectual property law and conflict of laws have proposed conflict-of-laws
solutions to simplify the enforcement of copyright on the Internet; their
solutions would not eliminate the differences among national copyright
laws but would limit the number of national copyright laws that would
apply to acts on the Internet in any given scenario.
This Article posits that the multiplicity of applicable national copyright laws on the Internet is not as significant a problem for law-abiding
Internet actors as some commentators fear. What makes the multiplicity
workable for Internet actors are the realities—or inefficiencies—of crossborder copyright enforcement that de facto limit the number of potentially applicable national copyright laws. This Article reviews the solutions
that have been proposed to address the multiplicity problem and examines the objections to the proposals that have already been or could be
raised. The Article then analyzes the current realities of copyright enforcement on the Internet and contrasts the realities with the anticipated
workings of the proposed solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
From the beginnings of the Internet1 a number of commentators have warned that Internet actors—Internet service providers,
website operators, content providers, and Internet users—cannot
comply with copyright law on the global digital network (or can
comply only with exorbitant costs) because of the large number of
countries’ copyright laws (“multiple copyright laws”) that apply to
the actors’ Internet activities.2 The multiplicity of potentially applicable national copyright laws (the “multiplicity problem”) is
caused by the nature of copyright as an intangible right created by
national laws and by the rules for choice of law applicable to copyright infringements and to other copyright-related acts and occurrences.
To determine which country’s copyright law applies, national
courts typically use (for infringements and often also for other copyright-related acts and occurrences)3 the choice-of-law rule that
points to the law of the place of the tortious activity (lex loci delicti,
lex loci protectionis).4 Unless Internet activities are limited geograph1

The term “Internet” is used throughout this Article as a generic term for any type of
electronic communication, even if it is not based on the Internet protocol. For a
discussion of the current use of the term, see Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel:
Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 567, 575 n.25 (2012).
2
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 480–81 (2000); Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing
Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 799, 807–
08 (1998) (discussing how different national copyright laws govern a work which has been
unlawfully reproduced in one country and made available to the public in another).
3
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing A Private International Intellectual
Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 729–33 (2009)
(reviewing the scope of application of the lex loci protectionis rule).
4
Most countries apply these rules to copyright infringement; countries’ rules for
choice of law applicable to other copyright-related acts and occurrences vary. Some
countries apply the rule of the law of the protecting country (lex loci protectionis), meaning
the law of the country whose law provides copyright protection to the work at issue and in
which copyright was infringed. Whether the Berne Convention mandates the rule or not
has been disputed. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private
International Law Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT
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ically through geoblocking5 or some form of censorship that disables access to content on the Internet,6 the effects of the activities
extend to all countries connected to the Internet (those countries
where the results of the activities can be viewed, downloaded, or
streamed) where—at least in theory—the activities cause each of
the countries to be a place of tortious activity, thereby subjecting
Internet actors to the copyright laws of each of the countries.7
The multiplicity of national copyright laws is problematic because countries’ copyright laws continue to differ despite a significant degree of harmonization of national copyright laws in the past
SOC’Y U.S.A. 318, 336–37 (1995) [hereinafter Global Use/Territorial Rights] (noting that
the language “where protection is sought” in Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention may
not necessarily refer to the law of where the infringement occurred, but rather to the law
of the forum country, i.e., lex fori); 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND
BEYOND § 20.01 (2d ed. 2005) (“[D]eriving from the Berne text supranational choice of
law rules is a delicate, if not improbable, operation.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT
HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 129 (2010)
(arguing that Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is not a choice of law provision but is
“essentially no more than a rule barring discrimination against foreign right holders,
which requires a country to apply the same law to works of foreign origin as it applies to
works of its own nationals”).
5
See Trimble, supra note 1, at 587–90.
6
See, e.g., Evgeny Mozorov, Egypt Action May Spread Internet Kill Switch Idea, S.F.
GATE, (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Egypt-action-may-spreadInternet-kill-switch-idea-3243860.php; Christopher Beam, Egypt Protest Internet Shut Off:
How did the Egyptian government turn off the Internet?, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2011, 4:55 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2283000/; James Crowie, Egypt Leaves the Internet, DYN
RESEARCH BLOG (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leavesthe-internet.shtml.
7
See, e.g., Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 322 (concluding that effective
judicial deterrence of piracy requires that intellectual property rights holders be able to
sue infringers in every country that infringing material may be received); Graeme W.
Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 79
OR. L. REV. 575, 588 (2000) (observing that applying lex loci in the digital world involves
the challenges of applying multiple copyright laws). This approach to choice of law is also
known as the “mosaic approach” and is consistent with the “Bogsch Theory,” named
after Arpad Bogsch, a WIPO Director, who advanced the proposition that “any utilisation
of a protected work that is relevant from the viewpoint of copyright takes place where the
work—through copies, through performance, or through any kind of communication
technique—is actually made available to the public.” Mihály Ficsor, Direct Broadcasting
by Satellite and the ‘Bogsch Theory’, 18 INT’L BUS. LAW. 258, 258 (1990). See also RITA
MATULIONYTĖ, LAW APPLICABLE TO COPYRIGHT: A COMPARISON OF THE ALI AND CLIP
PROPOSALS 126–29 (Edward Elgar 2011); JOSEF DREXL, INTERNATIONALES IMMATERIALGÜTERRECHT, IN MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB 251–58 (5th ed. 2010).
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130 years.8 Copyright practice itself does mitigate some of the continuing national copyright law differences when persons or entities
pursue multinational and comprehensive copyright strategies in
countries with different laws;9 however, the differences among
laws complicate cross-border activities involving copyrighted
works,10 particularly when less sophisticated persons or entities are
involved who cannot navigate the differences as effectively (or navigate them at all) as more experienced persons or entities can.
In the offline world it seems more likely that parties will realize
that the copyright laws of multiple countries may govern their activities; for example, a book publisher is likely to recognize the possibility that multiple copyright laws will be applicable when the
publisher ships physical books to and sells them in a foreign country. However, many Internet actors seem oblivious to the possibility that their Internet acts may subject them to a foreign country’s
laws; the actors might see their online activity, such as posting a
photograph on a website, as an activity that occurs in a single country—that country being where they are located when they post the
8

In the past 130 years, countries have concluded international treaties to harmonize
national copyright laws; however, the treaties include various flexibilities that allow
countries to maintain differences in their national laws. E.g., Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1896, 11850 U.N.T.S. 223 (1986)
[hereinafter Berne Convention] (as revised at Paris July 4, 1971 and amended Sept. 28,
1979); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WCT, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17. For an overview of flexibilities—both those intentionally
introduced in the treaties by treaty negotiators and those unintentionally persisting see,
for example, Marketa Trimble, Advancing National Intellectual Property Policies in a
Transnational Context, 74 MD. L. REV. 203 (2015).
9
For example, countries may agree that employers should be able to exercise
economic rights to works that their employees create in the course of employment. The
United States has a work-for-hire doctrine that achieves this result by vesting copyright to
the employee’s work in the employer; other countries with no work-for-hire doctrine
allow for copyright to employee-created works to be subject to an exclusive license that is
either granted in an employment contract or created by law. Compare 17 U.S.C. §201(b)
(2012) with Zhongua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhuzuo Quan Fa [Copyright Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990,
amended Feb. 26, 2010 by the Standing Comm of the Nat’l People’s Cong., amendments
effective Apr. 1, 2010) art. 16, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_
id=186569, and CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L113-9 (Fr.).
10
See discussion supra Introduction; see also Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4,
at 323–30; Austin, supra note 7, at 603–10.
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photograph. Alternatively, some Internet actors may mistakenly
believe that only the country of their domicile may legitimately regulate their conduct,11 or that because their acts occur on the Internet no country will or may regulate their conduct.12
Because the Internet makes it extremely easy to engage in
cross-border activities, it enables all Internet actors to engage in
such activities, and even actors who are not versed in the intricacies of international copyright are exposed to cross-border dealings
involving copyright issues. While offline cross-border activities
concerning copyrighted works13 have often been performed by sophisticated repeat players such as publishing houses, motion picture studios, and press agencies, online activities involving crossborder copyright issues concern Internet actors with varying levels
of awareness of, or possibly no awareness of, or experience with,
foreign copyright laws that might apply to their activities.14 The
multiplicity problem is exacerbated in the online world because the
number of countries’ laws implicated will typically be much higher
than in the offline world.15
Differences among countries’ copyright laws impact copyright
issues such as protectable subject matter, initial copyright ownership, licensing and assignments, rights, and exceptions and limitations to the rights. Internet actors are able to mitigate some of the
differences by identifying copyright owners and obtaining any necessary consent or licenses from them; however, transaction costs
may be high, and may even exceed the costs of assuming the risk of
copyright litigation when the Internet actors do not clear copyright
11
Although in many instances Internet actors may be subject to the law of only a single
country, and that country may be the country of their domicile (place of residence, place
of incorporation, or principal place of business), it is possible that in other instances
actors may also be subject to the laws of other countries.
12
See infra Part III.A (discussing the unawareness of many Internet actors with respect
to the cross-border implications of their conduct).
13
In this context, cross-border activities concerning copyrighted works do not include
de minimis importation for non-commercial purposes.
14
This Article leaves aside any discussion of whether the Internet is encouraging
copyright-infringing behavior because of the anonymity it provides and the
misconceptions it creates (e.g., perceptions that it is always legal to view, download, or
stream any content that is available for free online).
15
Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 541 (“The problems of cyberspace bring [conflict-oflaws] questions into sharper focus, and it is there that they appear most acute.”).
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beforehand. Differences among national copyright laws complicate
the identification of initial and subsequent copyright owners; the
differences also make it difficult to determine where particular
rights arise and where national laws carve out exceptions and limitations that allow for use of copyrighted works without permission
or a license in a particular situation. The following two examples
illustrate the complexities of cross-border activities involving copyrighted works.
The first example concerns rules for initial copyright ownership; the rules vary among countries, and one who is the owner of a
copyright to a work in one country might not be the owner of the
copyright to the same work in another country (under the latter
country’s law).16 Assume, for example, that a photographer employed by an advertising agency in the United States takes a photograph within the scope of his employment. Under the work made
for hire doctrine applicable in the United States, the agency is the
initial owner of copyright to the photograph.17 Germany, however,
has no work for hire doctrine;18 in Germany the initial copyright
ownership vests in the author, which in this example is the photographer who, absent his consent or a license he has granted, holds
the exclusive rights that attach to the copyright.19 If the agency intends to use the photograph on a website, it does not need consent
or a license from the photographer to do so in the United States,
but it will need his consent or license for other countries, such as
Germany, where the website is accessible and where the photo16

Some countries apply the law of the country of origin to the issue of initial copyright
ownership with the result that the copyright has the same initial copyright owner in these
countries as it has in the country of origin (provided that the law of the country of origin is
interpreted and applied in the same manner in these countries). See, e.g., Código Civil
Português, [C.Civ], Decreto-Lei n.º 47344/66 art. 48 (Port.).
17
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
18
Although no work for hire doctrine exists in Germany, an employer is entitled by law
to exercise economic rights to a computer program that was “created by an employee in
the performance of his duties or based on instructions from his employer.”
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [UrhG] [COPYRIGHT LAW], Sept. 9, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL.] art. 69b(1) (Ger.). This provision is consistent with Directive 2009/24 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, art. 2(3).
19
German courts will apply German law to determine who the copyright owner is in
this case because German courts apply the law of the country where protection is sought
to copyright ownership.
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grapher—and not the agency—owns the copyright to the photograph.20
The second example of differences in national copyright laws
concerns exceptions and limitations to copyright, which also vary
among countries; acts that may be performed in one country without permission or a license may require permission or a license in
another country.21 For example, one of the enumerated exceptions
under the German copyright statute allows the taking and posting
on the Internet (i.e., the acts of reproduction, distribution, and
making available to the public) of a photograph of a publicly accessible sculpture;22 there is a similar enumerated exception in the US
Copyright Act, but the US exception does not cover the acts when
they concern a stand-alone sculptural work (a sculpture that is not
embodied in an architectural work).23 This difference in national
laws means that the posting on the Internet of a photograph of a
publicly accessible stand-alone sculpture without permission or a
license will not infringe the copyright to the sculpture under German copyright law; however, in the United States the posting (the
public display) of the photograph on the Internet may infringe the
copyright to the sculpture under US copyright law (although the
20
If the facts are reversed (if the agency and the photographer were domiciled in
Germany), the different scenario would not necessarily create a problem; employment
contracts in civil law countries often provide for an exclusive permanent license in favor
of the employer. Additionally, US courts could decide to apply German law to assess the
ownership of copyright to the photograph if the photographer is a German resident, his
employer is a German entity, and the work was performed in Germany. See Itar-Tass
Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he law
of the country with the closest relationship to the work will apply to settle the ownership
dispute.”). Cf. Paul Edward Geller, Conflict of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and
Ownership Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315, 327 (2004) (criticizing the choice of
law analysis for copyright ownership in Itar-Tass and arguing that the Berne Convention
implies a conflict of law rule). But see Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 331
(“Apart from the article specifically addressing the law applicable to determine
ownership of copyright in cinematographic works, the Berne Convention proffers no
general choice of law rule for copyright ownership.”); William Patry, Choice of Law and
International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 409 (2000) (arguing that “there is no
Berne Convention requirement to apply national treatment to ownership of copyright”).
21
E.g., Martin Senftleben, Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models–Exploring
the Matrix of Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and Injunctions, 4 JIPITEC 87, 91
(2013).
22
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ of September 9, 1965, as last amended, art. 59(1).
23
17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2012).
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fair use doctrine under US law24 might provide a successful defense in some cases).25
Commentators have asserted that the multiplicity problem is a
major hurdle for the Internet and have developed solutions that
address the problem by providing for a single copyright law to apply to Internet activities.26 Two types of solutions seek to limit the
number of applicable copyright laws, but they employ different
means to achieve the goal.27 The first type of solution calls for the
creation of a single set of global copyright law standards that would
apply on the Internet globally; the set of standards could be introduced either as an extranational Internet-specific copyright law
(that would be either legislated or developed judicially) or as a uniform copyright law implemented through national legislations.28
The second type of solution aims to narrow the number of applicable copyright laws by utilizing special conflict-of-laws rules—rules
for choice of applicable law, personal jurisdiction, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; the special rules would
operate together to achieve a result in which only a single country’s
law (or the laws of a limited number of countries) applies (or apply)
to an Internet activity in any given case.29 So far the two types of
proposed solutions have gained little or no support from national
governments at the national and international levels,30 and the
24

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Theoretically, a US court could decide in this scenario to apply German law to the
acts of alleged infringement if the court found that German law had the most significant
relationship to the acts and the parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 145 (1971); Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82,
91 (2d Cir. 1998).
26
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 1, 44 (2000) (“Ideally, a choice of law rule that designated the law of a single
country to govern the ensemble of Internet copyright transactions would considerably
simplify the legal landscape, and thus promote Internet commerce.”).
27
See, e.g., Andrea Antonelli, Applicable Law Aspects of Copyright Infringement on the
Internet: What Principles Should Apply?, 2003 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (2003).
28
See infra Part I.
29
See infra Part II.
30
Some courts have referred to the proposals for special conflict-of-laws rules. See, e.g.,
Rundquist v. Vapiano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 132 (D.D.C. 2011); Lucasfilm Ltd. v.
Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39, ¶¶ 93–94; Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard Verlags, 2011
ECR I-12533, n.31; Case C-616/10, Solvay v. Honeywell, 2012 ECR. 193 , n.24 (opinion of
AG Villalón); Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 ECR, (opinion of
AG Jääskinen).
25
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specter of a multiplicity of applicable national copyright laws continues to loom over the Internet, at least in theory.
In practice, various limitations on copyright enforcement reduce the number of copyright laws that will apply to a particular
activity on the Internet. This Article argues that these limitations
fashion a system in which actors who wish to comply with copyright laws face fewer challenges on the Internet than critics who
perceive a multiplicity problem seem to assume. Some of these limitations arise because of countries’ limited abilities to enforce
their laws; as Jack Goldsmith noted in 1998 during the early years
of the commercial Internet, “the skeptics [have] exaggerate[d] the
threat of multiple regulation of cyberspace information flows” because “[t]his threat must be measured by a regulation’s enforceable scope.”31 Additional limitations come from the practicalities of
litigation, when copyright owners must decide which country’s or
countries’ laws they can and want to rely on when they enforce
their rights.
Although litigation represents only a small percentage of the
enforcement actions that copyright owners employ (only a small
percentage of copyright disputes result in court proceedings and
enforcements of final judgments), the availability and course of litigation impacts all other enforcement actions. Often the steps that
precede litigation will suffice to enforce copyright, and third parties
such as advertisers and payment processors may assist in extrajudicial enforcement, although Internet actor behavior and copyright owner negotiating positions will ultimately be affected by the
actual ability of copyright owners to effectively enforce their copyrights (i.e. whether copyright laws can and will actually be enforced).32 Given the global nature of most Internet actions and the
persisting differences among countries’ copyright laws, conflict-oflaws solutions to the multiplicity problem should assist in making
effective cross-border enforcement feasible and thus positively im31

Jack J. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1220 (1998). These
limited abilities are shared by all countries and arise from the general limited abilities of
countries to enforce their laws extraterritorially. See Trimble, supra note 8, at 11–19
(discussing the difference between the territorial scope of prescriptive jurisdiction and the
territorial scope of the actual enforcement power).
32
E.g., Eric Priest, Acupressure: The Emerging Role of Market Ordering in Global
Copyright Enforcement (forthcoming).
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pact the functioning of copyright laws on the Internet. The question is whether the existing proposals address the practical inefficiencies of cross-border copyright enforcement sufficiently to improve on the status quo; it seems that even if countries were to
adopt the conflict-of-laws rules that have been proposed many litigation limitations would persist and continue to limit the number of
countries’ laws that are de facto regulating conduct on the Internet
in particular cases.
This Article begins by analyzing the proposals for solving the
multiplicity problem. The first part discusses proposals that seek to
achieve single global copyright standards, and the second part
presents proposed conflict-of-laws solutions. For each type of solution the Article reviews existing critiques of the proposals and examines additional rationales that make the proposals unacceptable
or unpalatable to national governments, including, for the conflictof-laws solutions, the difficulty of accepting the notion of copyright
infringement as a single-place tort. The third part confronts the
theoretical concern about the multiplicity of potentially applicable
copyright laws on the Internet and the realities of copyright enforcement. The Article posits that the proposed solutions, if implemented, would not dramatically change the copyright litigation
landscape because many of the current realities of cross-border
copyright litigation would continue to shape the landscape.
I. PROPOSALS FOR A GLOBAL COPYRIGHT
The first type of solution proposed to address the multiplicity
problem would introduce a single set of global copyright law standards.33 The uniform standards would give legal certainty to Internet actors and copyright owners, who could then shape their activities to comport with the standards. Some observers might view the
setting of uniform standards as a natural milestone on the trajectory of international copyright law negotiations through which countries have been gradually harmonizing their copyright laws over the
past 130 years.34 However, the trajectory might not be so
33

E.g., Antonelli, supra note 27, at 177 (admitting that “the task seems almost
impossible”).
34
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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straightforward; current international developments do not seem
to be headed towards a deeper harmonization of copyright law,
commentators debate the desirability of international uniformity of
copyright laws,35 and some critics flatly reject the utility of a uniform global copyright law.36
A. A Single Copyright Law for the Online Environment
Faced with the specter of a multiplicity of national laws (and
not only copyright laws) on the Internet, some experts have suggested that a new legal order be created to govern activities on the
Internet.37 For these Internet exceptionalists, the process of creating a new legal order would provide an opportunity to design the
order while respecting and utilizing the architecture of the Internet.
The designing of the new legal order would also be a chance for experimentation—a chance to craft the legal order in a manner that
would reflect opposition to entrenched copyright norms that existing national legal regimes perpetuate; the new legal order could
promote norms that the online community has embraced.
One problem with an extranational Internet-specific legal regime is its legitimacy: Can anyone design a legal order for the Internet that could legitimately bind all actors on the Internet? Leaving the design of the legal regime to the community of Internet actors might have been attractive at the beginnings of the Internet
when it was populated by a limited group of educated users in se35

See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 23–24, 44–48, 75–78 (1997); Jane
C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From A “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to A
Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 267 (2000) (“[N]ational laws
allocating copyright ownership form the strongest candidates for preservation; national
exceptions to copyright present a more difficult, but potentially persuasive, case for
persistence of national norms as well.”). See also Austin, supra note 7 (commenting on the
prospect of a single national copyright law applying in multinational cases and discussing
the same rationales against a choice of law outcome).
36
E.g., Graeme W. Austin, Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in International
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1158 (2002); Paul
Torremans, Copyright Territoriality in a Borderless Online Environment, in COPYRIGHT IN A
BORDERLESS ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 23, 35 (Johan Axhamn ed., 2012).
37
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (“This . . . distinct Cyberspace . . . needs and can
create its own law and legal institutions.”); Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: Foundations of
Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 222, 236–37 (1997).
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lect countries; indeed, the approach worked for technical Internet
architecture-specific issues such as standard setting and regulation
of the domain name system, including the ICANN dispute resolution mechanism. However, with the complexities of the Internet
ecosystem today, including the proliferation of different types of
actors and activities on the Internet, it seems highly unlikely that it
would be possible to identify (outside the framework of national
and international law) a means for the design and adoption of an
Internet-specific legal regime that would enjoy the requisite global
legitimacy. If national courts were to follow Graeme Dinwoodie’s
proposal and devise a special regime through their decisions, the
special regime would alleviate the concern about legitimacy (perhaps in some countries more than in others), but the judiciallycreated system certainly would not eliminate the concern.38
Another problem with the proposals for an Internet-specific legal regime is that the proposals ignore the fact that Internet activities have strong connections to the offline world; because of the
connections (not only in copyright but in most areas of the law)
countries would be very unlikely to relinquish their prescriptive
jurisdiction for the online world. If a motion picture is shared online without the permission of or a license from its copyright owner, the effects of the free sharing will be felt in the offline world,
and they will impact the copyright owner’s and licensees’ reve-

38

Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 542–43 (“Under this approach . . . a court faced with an
international copyright dispute would . . . develop (and apply) a substantive rule of
copyright law that best effectuates [the] range of policies [implicated in the dispute].”).
For Dinwoodie’s response to the legitimacy problem see id. at 575–77. Annette Kur
asserted that a judicially-developed, Internet-specific regime would decrease legal
certainty “at least during the interim phase needed for building up a solid framework of
case law.” EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GROUP ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND
COMMENTARY art. 3:603 n.7 (2013) [hereinafter CLIP PRINCIPLES]. For Dinwoodie’s
response to concerns about legal certainty see Dinwoodie, supra note 2, pp. 571–75. See
also Reindl, supra note 2, at 810–11 (criticizing “cyberspace lex mercatoria”); Joanna
Kulesza & Roy Balleste, Signs and Portents in Cyberspace: The Rise of Jus Internet as a New
Order in International Law, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1311, 1345
(2013) (proposing a similar framework not limited to copyright law); Jane C. Ginsburg,
The Private International Law of Copyright in An Era of Technological Change, in
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 376–408
(Matinus Nijhoff Publishers ed., 1998).
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nues, together with countries’ tax revenues and other interests.39
An Internet-specific legal regime inconsistent with a country’s own
copyright law40 would destabilize the delicate balance that the
country strives (or should strive) to achieve with its copyright policies.
The skepticism toward an Internet-specific copyright regime
does not mean that every Internet-specific legal regime is unsuitable. Matters that concern the technical infrastructure of the network require Internet-specific regulation, for example the administration of the domain name system; Internet service provider liability for content posted by others has also been subject to Internetspecific legislation, including in the area of copyright law.41 Some
Internet-specific regulation that addresses the technical infrastructure is subject to extranational regulation (e.g., again the domain
name system); other Internet-specific regulation, such as limitations on the liability of Internet service providers, is governed by
national laws.42 However, even in the limited areas governed by
extranational Internet-specific regulation countries maintain their
right to have input into the final decisions.43
Countries hesitate to outsource their control over fundamental
rights to non-state bodies, and copyright law involves such rights
because it results from a balancing of the right to free speech (freedom of expression) and the right to property (in some countries
intellectual property is covered explicitly by the fundamental right

39

Peter K. Yu, Towards the Seamless Global Distribution of Cloud Content in PRIVACY
LEGAL ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING (Anne S. Y. Cheung & Rolf H. Weber eds.)
(forthcoming 2015).
40
Although an Internet-specific regime might match a country’s copyright law, the
likelihood is high that some differences would exist because different institutions would
shape the regime and the law.
41
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
42
In the EU, the provisions on the limitation of ISP liability are subject to very general
harmonization through Articles 12–15 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L
178) [hereinafter EU E-Commerce Directive].
43
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (the anti-cybersquatting provisions of the Lanham
Act in the United States); Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de
Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
AND
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to property).44 Countries could in theory, by adopting an international copyright law regime, address the need for an Internetspecific copyright regime without outsourcing the regime to a nonstate body. An international law solution would obviate the problem of legitimacy; although negotiating an international regime entails compromises that may constrain national policies and national
sovereignty, international negotiations allow countries to maintain
a certain degree of control over the design of the regime and contribute to the shaping of the regime.45 Nevertheless, international
agreement on a single copyright law for the Internet is unlikely to
occur soon; a copyright law for the Internet that would be in harmony with the multiplicity of national copyright laws for the offline
world would be difficult to create, and the likelihood that countries
could agree on uniform copyright laws for the offline world is slim.
Many countries appear reluctant to harmonize copyright laws more
deeply than they already have.
B. Uniform National Copyright Laws
A cursory review of the history of treaties on copyright law
might suggest a trajectory of gradually deepening harmonization of
44
E.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 17(2), 2010 O.J. C
83/02, at 395; GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I (Ger.), art. 14 (interpreted by German courts as
covering intellectual property). For IP-specific provisions in national constitutions, see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; The Czech Republic’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms, Article 34; Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Section 13;
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Section 60.
45
Graeme Dinwoodie has pointed out that international agreements concerning
copyright have been, “in large part, codifications of commonly held, and already
nationally implemented, copyright policies, and thus had a backward looking
perspective.” Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 493. This is a not a characteristic unique to
international copyright negotiations; it is understandable that countries enter
international negotiations with the goal of achieving a result consistent with their own
legislation and practices, and countries with strong negotiating positions and political
power often achieve their goals. The situation may be different if governments (or some
factions in the governments) used the international forum to pursue domestic agendas
they pursued unsuccessfully at the national level; the international forum may give the
agendas legitimacy and impose the agendas on domestic actors once the agendas are
embodied in international treaties that governments must implement. This strategy is
commonly utilized in hierarchical settings, such as in regional organizations and federal
countries. See also id. at 499–501 (“The relationship [of national, regional, and
international developments] is increasingly complex and multidirectional.”).
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national copyright laws, but while the impression is accurate with
respect to the past 130 years, the trajectory might not be an accurate predictor of the future of international copyright harmonization. The TRIPS-plus movement, which wants to raise levels of
intellectual property (“IP”) protection above the minimum standards contained in the TRIPS Agreement,46 has encountered
strong opposition from numerous IP experts and at least some of
the general public. The general public’s intense concern for the
proper protection of IP users’ interests makes expansions of IP
rights and increased protection of IP rights highly unpopular. A
deeper harmonization of exceptions and limitations might find
more supporters, but even this direction of harmonization faces
opposition, namely from copyright owners; for example, some copyright owners observed the negotiations of the Marrakesh Treaty47
with great concern as to whether the Treaty, which solidifies certain exceptions and limitations to copyright in favor of access for
the visually impaired,48 could become a Trojan horse for a future
weakening of copyright protection through international treaties.49
The concerns of particular stakeholders about stronger or
weaker copyright protection are not the only brakes on further international copyright harmonization. The environment at the international level is sufficiently infused with conflict to retard further harmonization efforts. The agendas of the developed countries
conflict with the plans of the developing and the least developed
countries, which are pursuing an international agenda for the protection of traditional knowledge, folklore, and genetic resources. A
number of experts have emphasized the value of diversity in na-

46

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are
Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 31, 2013, WIPO Doc.
VIP/DC/8, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/vip_dc/vip_
dc_8_rev.pdf [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty].
48
The Marrakesh Treaty does not impose exceptions and limitations that go beyond
the existing three-step-test framework. See id. at art. 1 and the Agreed Statement
Concerning Article 4(3).
49
See, e.g., William New, Negotiators, Stakeholders Tell Tale of WIPO Marrakesh Treaty
Negotiation, Look to Implementation, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/09/20/negotiators-stakeholders-tell-tale-of-wipomarrakesh-treaty-negotiation-look-to-implementation/.
47
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tional IP legislation50 and argued in favor of greater use of existing
treaty flexibilities to tailor IP regimes to countries’ unique circumstances. Historical, cultural, sociopolitical, and economic differences among countries are among the reasons for which individuallytailored national copyright laws seem desirable, and national governments seem more active than they were only a decade ago in
searching for ways to stretch national legislation and practice to
benefit fully from the range of flexibilities that are provided in international treaties.51
Even if countries could agree on a uniform set of copyright law
standards, some national differences would persist and/or develop
over time. With no unified court structure, differences would appear; a truly uniform legal regime cannot exist without a unifying
interpretation that all courts and administrative agencies would
have to follow. With no uniform interpretation national courts and
administrative agencies develop different interpretations of standards and perpetuate existing or create new differences among national copyright laws, notwithstanding identical language in national copyright statutes. Absent a court or other body that renders decisions that are precedential and/or delivers binding interpretations
of uniform standards, does so with sufficient frequency to develop
the necessary breadth and depth of interpretation, and reacts to
permanently changing conditions, the uniformity of national copyright laws is illusory. Additionally, even if copyright laws were uniform, differences in laws that national courts would apply to ancillary issues, such as contract issues, and differences in procedural
rules would maintain or create differences in the functioning of the
“uniform” laws in various countries.52
II. PROPOSED CONFLICT-OF-LAWS SOLUTIONS
If national courts adjudicate cases that involve parties from different countries and/or implicate different national copyright laws,
50

E.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 518–21.
E.g., Ruth Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations:
Twenty One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L LAW (forthcoming 2015).
52
For a discussion of the situation involving EU unitary rights (trademarks and
designs) see Marketa Trimble, Extraterritorial Enforcement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SYSTEMS IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW, 303, 321–22 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2013).
51
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the courts face questions of jurisdiction, choice of applicable law,
and potentially also the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments—all of which are conflict-of-laws questions.53 The more
deeply that national laws are harmonized, however, the less significant will be the consequences of the choice-of-law analysis;54 if
copyright laws were uniform, choice of law, at least as to the applicable copyright law, would be unnecessary.55 Operating on the
premise that the likelihood is very high that national copyright laws
will remain different, some scholars who seek to identify solutions
to the multiplicity problem focus on conflict-of-laws rules, including rules for choice of applicable law, as the avenue for solving the
problem.
Under the prevailing choice-of-law rule the laws of all countries
connected to the Internet might apply to Internet activities. Copyright vests automatically in (in some countries upon fixation, in
other countries upon creation), at a minimum, all 168 countries
that are parties to the Berne Convention.56 When a work is made
available on the Internet, that act can infringe copyright in multiple
or even in all of the countries in which the content can be viewed,
downloaded, or streamed. Of course countries’ laws differ, and
there can be no infringement committed in countries where the
work falls outside copyright protection (because of the subject matter of the work,57 its author,58 or the expiration of its copyright
term59), or in countries in which the act is not considered infringing
53

See also Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1232 (noting that a variety of available tools to
“facilitate and rationalize legal regulation of cyberspace . . . will not eliminate all conflict
of laws in cyberspace any more than they do in real space. . . . [T]he elimination of
conflict of laws would require the elimination of decentralized lawmaking or of
transnational activity.”).
54
See Trimble, supra note 8 (discussing the relationship between substantive law and
choice of law rules).
55
Choice of law will still matter for ancillary substantive issues; even if treaties
“harmonize national copyright laws comprehensively enough,” they will not render the
choice of law analysis obsolete. Cf. Reindl, supra note 2, at 812.
56
Contracting Parties to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/
berne.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
57
E.g., because of different requirements for originality.
58
E.g., works by the US federal government in the United States.
59
Under international treaties, many countries must provide copyright protection for
at least a minimum period but countries may provide a longer term of protection. Berne
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(because of a different interpretation of the particular right or because of an applicable exception or limitation to copyright protection). Regardless of whether the laws of all countries hold the work
protected and the act infringing, the possibility exists that all countries’ laws could apply simultaneously.60
Existing rules of personal jurisdiction and choice of law do not
provide relief from the multiplicity problem, at least not in theory.
Courts of general jurisdiction61 may decide all claims raised against
an alleged infringer—irrespective of whether the claims are based
on their own country’s laws or are based on foreign laws—as long
as the courts consider the foreign-law claims to be transitory causes
of action, meaning causes of action that may be litigated before
them even if the causes of action arose under a foreign country’s
law. Courts in some countries have expressed a willingness to treat
copyright infringement as a transitory cause of action,62 meaning
that the courts could decide worldwide copyright infringements

Convention, supra note 4, at art. 7; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 12; Beijing
Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, June 24, 2012, WIPO Doc. AVP/DC/20, available
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_dc/avp_dc_20.pdf. Also,
copyright terms to the same work may expire at different times under the laws of the
United States and other countries, including the country of the work’s origin, because of
the copyright term restoration provisions of the US Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 104A
(2012).
60
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing geoblocking—the possibility of
limiting the accessibility of content on the Internet and thus the number of countries
whose laws apply to the content).
61
General jurisdiction exists where the alleged infringer has its domicile, which can be,
depending on local laws, its place of residence, its place of incorporation, or its principal
place of business. See, e.g., Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on the Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, 7, 18, arts. 4, 63
[hereinafter Brussels I Regulation (recast)]. In the United States, general jurisdiction
exists in the forum state when a corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the corporation] essentially at home in the
forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011).
62
See London Film Productions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F.
Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Creative Technology Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61
F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39; Jedis Ltd. v
Vodafone New Zealand Ltd. [2012] NZHC 2448, ¶ 39. See also infra notes 200 and 201 and
accompanying text. Cf. Gallo Africa Ltd. v Sting Music 2010 (6) SA 329 (SCA) (pre-dating
the UK Supreme Court decision in Lucasfilm).
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while applying the laws of all the countries in which infringements
occur.
Litigating in one court under multiple national copyright laws
should not be possible if the court is a court of specific jurisdiction
because courts of specific jurisdiction adjudicate only causes of action arising within their jurisdiction and relating to a ground of specific jurisdiction. In copyright infringement cases specific jurisdiction typically exists in the place of infringement, and because the
laws of all countries connected to the Internet may be infringed by
Internet activities, the courts of all countries may have specific jurisdiction63 (the court of the alleged infringer’s domicile maintains
general jurisdiction) and therefore can apply their own laws to the
infringement that occurred in their countries.
This part reviews two choice-of-law approaches that may limit
the number of laws applicable to Internet activities. The first approach (the “localization approach”) uses the existing choice-oflaw rule of the place of the tortious activity but shifts the focus of
the localization of the tort (the identification of the place of the
tort) to an occurrence or fact that can be pinpointed in a single location, such as the place where the alleged infringer acted or the
place where the copyright owner is domiciled, under the theory
that the act or occurrence marks the one place where the tort was
actually committed or where all of its effects are felt.64 The second
approach (the “factors approach”) requires countries to adopt a
new choice-of-law rule that calls on courts to choose a single applicable national copyright law (or a small number of applicable national copyright laws) based on a weighing of multiple factors.
The implementation of the two choice-of-law approaches
presents obstacles no less significant than those that countries
would encounter if they attempted to introduce a single global copyright standard. Although the choice-of-law approaches would re63

Cf. infra Part III.B.
The discussions of this approach mirror the general debates about tort localization.
See, e.g., 2 ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 233 (1947); 3
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG & ERIK JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE
TREATISE ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS LAW, INCLUDING THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 64 (1977); C.G.J. MORSE, TORTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 113
(1978).
64
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lieve the pressure that countries would face if they were to harmonize their substantive laws, and the approaches would allow countries to maintain their different national copyright laws, the approaches would require collective action on choice-of-law rules;
only if all countries adopted the same approach would choice-oflaw approaches be successful in eliminating the multiplicity problem. Agreeing on choice-of-law approaches might be challenging,
particularly since the approaches would only solve the multiplicity
problem if they were combined with appropriate rules for personal
jurisdiction; the negotiations of the proposed Hague Convention
have demonstrated the difficulty that countries have in harmonizing rules of personal jurisdiction internationally.65
A. The Localization Approach
The localization approach to solving the multiplicity problem
seeks to identify an occurrence or fact that can be understood as
the place of a tortious activity and be localized in a single place.
One possible place is the place from which the allegedly infringing
activity emanates, or “[t]he point of origin of the alleged infringement”66—the place where the alleged infringer acted. On the Internet this rule might lead to the alleged infringer’s domicile, if that
is where the infringer acted, but it could lead to another jurisdiction
if the infringer acted in the other jurisdiction (e.g., the alleged infringer might have uploaded content while on vacation abroad).
Another localization might be in the domicile of the copyright
owner; the theory for this approach is that the place of the tortious

65

The proposal to draft a convention on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters began to be discussed by the Special
Commission on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference in 1994. In 2002 The
Hague Conference decided to postpone work on the draft and ordered a new draft to be
prepared that would avoid conflicts among countries on rules of jurisdiction. The Hague
Conference reopened the project for a general convention on jurisdiction and recognition
and enforcement in 2012. See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=149
(last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
66
AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROP.: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION,
CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES § 321 n.1 (2008)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
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activity is the place in which the entire harm is concentrated—the
place where the harm is internalized by the copyright owner.67
Critics argue that the localization approach is problematic because the operative occurrence or fact can be manipulated. Their
concern is that the alleged infringer can easily choose the place
from which he acts, and that the copyright owner can easily choose
the place where he is domiciled. The expected result of the race to
the bottom and the race to the top is that prospective infringers will
move their activities to jurisdictions having the weakest copyright
protection (the weakest protection being caused by either less copyright owner protective legislation or ineffective enforcement),
while copyright owners will relocate to jurisdictions with the
strongest copyright protection.68 It is debatable to what extent this
concern is valid; historical, legal, financial, technical, and logistical
considerations are some of the many considerations that influence
decisions that determine the location of particular persons and entities. Some persons and entities will indeed relocate to a particular
jurisdiction solely or primarily because of the favorable legal environment that the jurisdiction offers, which may include weaker
copyright protection.69 The question is whether choice-of-law rules
are the proper vehicle for countries to address problems with a jurisdiction that develops a reputation as a haven for alleged infringers; countries may reach for means other than choice-of-law rules
to achieve the goal of adequate protection of copyright. The follow-

67

Paul Geller proposed that courts “localise the place of infringement in the country of
the targeted market.” Paul Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflict of Laws and
Internet Remedies, 22(3) EIPR 125, 129 (2000). This approach is not discussed in detail in
this section because the analysis for this approach involves additional factors; therefore,
the approach is included under the “factors approach.” The approach may or may not
lead to a limitation on the number of applicable laws. Jane Ginsburg proposed that in
some circumstances courts should apply “the law of the place of the server or of the
defendant’s domicile.” Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and
Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153,
173 (1997). The rule of the place of the server may be viewed as a variation on the rule of
the place from which the infringement originates because in many cases the result will be
identical. See also infra note 83 and the accompanying text.
68
Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 336; Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 44;
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt. 1 and Reporter’s Notes; DREXL, supra note 7, at
291–96; CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 39, at art. 3:603 cmt. 7.
69
E.g., Kazaa was based in Vanuatu; Megaupload Ltd. is incorporated in Hong Kong.
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ing sections discuss additional advantages and disadvantages presented by the two localization rules.
1. Localization in the Place of Origin of the Alleged
Infringement
The rule that localizes copyright infringement in the place of
origin of the alleged infringement—in the place where the alleged
infringer acted—promotes, to the extent that the national copyright policies of the countries are different, the copyright policies of
the alleged infringer’s jurisdiction to the detriment of the policies
of the copyright owner’s jurisdiction.70 The rule promotes the interests of the infringer’s jurisdiction in shaping the conduct of Internet users; the jurisdiction might punish Internet users for copyright infringing conduct (including through punitive damages if the
jurisdiction’s law provides for them),71 but it might also protect
Internet actors’ interests through exceptions and limitations to
copyright. The rule does not promote the policies of the copyright
owner’s jurisdiction, nor does the rule promote the copyright policies of any other jurisdictions where the content is accessed or accessible.72 Naturally, an inability to promote certain interests in
cross-border scenarios will be mitigated when countries’ interests
are identical or sufficiently similar.
From the perspective of legal certainty, the rule is advantageous for Internet actors because they can easily determine ex ante
which copyright law regulates their conduct,73 and they can rely on
that law always applying to their conduct regardless of where the
copyright-protected work at issue and its copyright owner originate
and which country’s court might render a decision on an actor’s
conduct. The rule is disadvantageous to copyright owners because
they cannot predict which copyright laws will govern Internet ac70
Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 44 (“[T]he point of origin approach has the effect of
extruding the country of origin’s copyright policy choices, to the detriment of copyright
policies in the other countries of receipt.”).
71
Punitive damages in copyright are not awarded only in common law jurisdictions;
some civil law jurisdictions also provide for punitive damages. See, e.g., Copyright and
Related Rights Act of 1995 (as last amended on Dec. 15, 2006) (in force Jan. 13, 2007), art.
168 (Slovn.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=180840.
72
Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 44.
73
The determination could be complicated if the location of the conduct is disputed.
See infra notes 92–100 and accompanying text.
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tors’ conduct, and they will have to familiarize themselves ex post
with whatever foreign country’s law will govern the actions of the
actors and determine whether copyright was infringed.
The localization approach that uses the place of origin of an infringement as the operative fact aligns well with the current rules of
personal jurisdiction, as long as an alleged infringer acts in the
place of his domicile; in this scenario a court in the place of the alleged infringer’s domicile has general jurisdiction, meaning that
the court may decide all claims brought against the alleged infringer.74 Under the rule of the place of origin of an infringement, if the
alleged infringer acts in his domicile the court of his domicile
would apply the law of its country (the forum law) and decide the
infringement worldwide. Courts in other countries would have
specific jurisdiction based on the place of the tortious activity,
which would allow those other courts to adjudicate only infringements that occurred in their respective countries; however, those
other courts would also apply the law of the alleged infringement’s
origin to decide the case.
That a court of general jurisdiction would apply the forum
law—the national law with which the court is most familiar—to a
worldwide infringement would certainly be a significant benefit of
this rule. There is nothing inherently problematic about a court
having to apply foreign law; courts must and do apply foreign law
from time to time. However, there is value in having a court apply
the forum law. The value would not be realized, however, if the
alleged infringer acted outside the country of his domicile, for example while on vacation;75 in this case the rule would mean that the
court of general jurisdiction, which would be the court of the alleged infringer’s domicile, would have to apply the law of the foreign jurisdiction where the infringing activity occurred to adjudicate the infringement worldwide, including in the jurisdiction of
the court and the infringer’s domicile. The court that would be
most familiar with the foreign law, the court in the foreign country,
would have only specific jurisdiction and could decide only the infringement in its own country.
74

See supra note 61 and accompanying text for an explanation of general jurisdiction.
See Ginsburg, note 67, at 172 (noting that “to some extent, the ‘point of origin’
approach and the defendant’s domicile may converge”).
75
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The localization approach that is based on the place from which
infringing conduct emanates is not an abstract academic construct;
the approach, which is based on the “emission theory,” found a
place in the European Union (“EU”) Satellite and Cable Directive76 and in the EU E-Commerce Directive.77 The EU Satellite
and Cable Directive localizes the “act of communication to the
public by satellite” “solely . . . where . . . signals are introduced
into an uninterrupted chain of communication”;78 the EU ECommerce Directive makes only the law of the country in which a
service provider is established applicable to the service provider’s
activities, and limits a country’s ability to regulate service providers who are established in other EU member countries.79 While the
EU Satellite and Cable Directive concerns neighboring (“copyright-related”) rights,80 the EU E-Commerce Directive makes the
emission principle inapplicable to “copyright, neighboring rights,
. . . and . . . industrial property rights.”81
Jane Ginsburg recommended the emission principle for copyright infringement cases in a 1995 article; she called for the application of the law of “the country from which the infringing act or acts
originated” only if an additional factor was satisfied: the law was
also the forum law. In concert with some other commentators she
also proposed the use of localization in other places that could all
be understood as alternatives to the place of origin of the infringement; she suggested that the forum law should also apply if it is the
law of “the country in which the defendant resides or of which it is
a national or domiciliary; or the country in which the defendant
maintains an effective business establishment.”82 Other commen76
Council Directive 93/83/EEC, of 27 September 1993 on the Coordination of Certain
Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite
Broadcasting and Cable R,etransmission 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15 [hereinafter EU Satellite
and Cable Directive].
77
EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 42.
78
EU Satellite and Cable Directive, supra note 76, at art.1(2)(b).
79
EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 42, at art. 3(1) & (2).
80
EU Satellite and Cable Directive, supra note 76, at art. 5.
81
EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 42, at art. 3(3) & Annex.
82
Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 338; see also Ginsburg, supra note 67, at
171, 173 (proposing that “if it is possible to localize in the United States the point from
which the unauthorized communication becomes available to the public (wherever that
public be located), then US law should apply to all unauthorized copies, wherever
communicated” and for defendants who are not domiciled in the United States and who
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tators proposed variations of the rule of the place of origin of the
infringement; for example they suggested applying the law of the
place of the server.83 Mark Kightlinger proposed the EU ECommerce Directive approach as a model for international internet
regulation.84
Some commentators have noted that the rule that localizes the
place of infringement in the place of origin of the infringement is
similar to the “root copy approach” that some US courts have
adopted; under that approach “the extraterritorial infringements
are all the direct consequences of a local US infringement.”85
However, in the cases cited for this proposition, US courts have
not applied US law to activities abroad but they have applied US
law solely to acts that occurred in the United States, and the courts
then used the constructive trust theory to justify the recovery of
profits that accrued from outside the United States but emanated
from infringing acts in the United States.86 The results of the application of the root copy approach are similar to the results that US
courts would have achieved if they had applied US law to activities
outside the United States, and indeed copyright owners resort to
the root copy approach as an alternative to litigating under multiple
copyright laws; this use of the root copy approach will be discussed

acted from outside the United States, proposing that US courts apply “either . . . the law
of the place of the server or of the defendant’s domicile.”); Jane C. Ginsburg,
Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 587,
600 (1997).
83
See generally Austin, supra note 7, at 592.
84
See Mark F. Kightlinger, A Solution to the Yahoo! Problem? The EC E-Commerce
Directive as A Model for International Cooperation on Internet Choice of Law, 24 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 719 (2003).
85
Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 335.
86
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 48–52 (2d Cir. 1939)
(“[A]n infringer . . . is like any other constructive trustee. . . . The negatives were
‘records’ from which the work could be ‘reproduced’, and it was a tort to make them in
this country. The plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest in them as soon as they were
made, which attached to any profits from their exploitation, whether in the form of money
remitted to the United States, or of increase in the value of shares of foreign companies
held by the defendants. . . . [A]s soon as any of the profits so realized took the form of
property whose situs was in the United States, our law seized upon them and impressed
them with a constructive trust . . .”). See also Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988); LA News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 340 F.3d 926 (9th Cir.
2003).
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later.87 The results, however, are not identical. It appears that US
courts will award profits lost because of the activities abroad but
not damages attributable to the activities abroad;88 also, only profits
linked to a specific type of infringement in the United States will be
recoverable,89 and statutory damages will not be available for acts
committed outside the United States.90 Additionally, a judgment
awarding foreign profits under the constructive trust theory will
not result in the adjudicated case being res judicata for copyright
infringement claims under the copyright laws of the foreign countries covered by the foreign profit award.91
Some commentators have argued that the localization approach, when its use is based on any act occurring on the Internet,
is unfit for the ubiquitous medium that the Internet represents;92
for example, the ALI Principles contend that the point of origin can
be difficult to identify on “digital networks, particularly in the context of peer-to-peer exchanges.”93 Undeniably, acts on the Internet
can often be localized in multiple places;94 the localization can fo-

87

See infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., LA News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 340 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2003).
89
See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976)
(“It is only when the type of infringement permits further reproduction abroad that its
exploitation abroad becomes the subject of a constructive trust.”).
90
Courts award statutory damages per infringed work; statutory damages cover only
works infringed under the US Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
91
If the copyright owner subsequently raised his infringement claims under foreign
laws, a court would presumably take the existing profit award into consideration when
deciding on remedies in the subsequent proceeding.
92
Reindl, supra note 2, at 815 (“Efforts to localize infringing conduct on digital
networks may be criticized for being too attached to conventional concepts of territorial
laws and not sensitive enough for the non-territorial and extranational nature of digital
networks.”); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 535 (“The place where an act of alleged
infringement ‘occurs’ has become difficult to determine in the digital environment;
concepts such as ‘place’ of publication or ‘country of origin’ lose meaning in a global and
digital world, where geography holds less significance.”).
93
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt.1.
94
Some US courts have localized publication in the United States when the person
who posted the content on the Internet was located outside the United States when the
person posted the content. See, e.g., Kernal Records OY v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355
(S.D. Fla. 2011). But cf. Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Del. 2009); Rogers
v. The Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 722 (S.D.
Tex. 2012). See also Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition of Publication in
Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1747–50 (2008); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 537
88
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cus on the technical features of an act (e.g., where the bits are set in
motion and/or where they travel on the network when a user requests a website) or on the human aspects of an act (e.g., where the
person used a keyboard or other hardware when the person posted
content on a website).95
The evolution of the Internet and of courts’ understanding of
the Internet seem to have progressed to the point at which courts
focus on the human aspects of acts—the location of the alleged infringer and the accessibility (by humans) of the work, which seems
to be a reasonable result given the number of locations through
which data travel and where data reside on the network.96 For example, when a user posted a work online while the user was in
Canada, a US court found that the act of displaying the work publicly occurred in Canada (where the user was located when he
acted), but that it also occurred in the United States and other
countries where users had access to the work on the Internet.97
Places through which the data might have traveled without humans
accessing them seemed irrelevant in the analysis, as a number of
courts rejected localization based on purely technical features that
would lead, for example, to localization based on the locations of
servers that happen to be involved in the transmission of content.98
(“[I]n a digital world . . . publication may occur simultaneously in a number of
countries.”).
95
For a discussion of localization of acts on the Internet see Trimble, supra note 1, at
607–10.
96
John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism,
74 IND. L.J. 893, 981 (1999) (“Jurisdiction should not depend on the physical location of
the various computers that enable online communications, or the location of the owners
of those computers, but rather on the location of the parties to online communications.”);
Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, ¶ 146 (“[T]he injunction would
compel Google to take steps in California or the state in which its search engine is
controlled.”).
97
See, e.g., Shropshire v. Canning, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1145–47 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
98
DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNET
356–57 (2012). Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 173 (proposing that “the law of the place of
the server” should apply in some circumstances) and JANE C. GINSBURG, WIPO, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE PROTECTION OF WORKS AND OBJECTS OF RELATED
RIGHTS TRANSMITTED THROUGH DIGITAL NETWORKS 45 (1998), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/gcpic/gcpic_2.pdf.
The “server test” established for personal jurisdiction in Perfect 10 v. Google Inc.,
concerned the incorporation of content that is posted by a third party (hyperlinking) and
prefers the human aspect approach, which leads to the party that posted the content on
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Localization of persons on the Internet has become easier in recent years as identification and geolocation technologies have
evolved to assist in localizing acts on the Internet; this localizing
renders the Internet less of a borderless space than it was once perceived to be.99 It may be difficult to localize an Internet user at the
particular moment when the user engaged in a specific activity on
the Internet, but in most cases localization is possible, albeit with
costs that might be higher than the costs would be for localization
in the offline environment.100
2. Localization in the Copyright Owner’s Domicile
The rule that localizes copyright infringement in the place of a
copyright owner’s domicile promotes the copyright policy of the
copyright owner’s country101—the country can effectively legislate
for the copyright owner’s compensation and influence prospective
copyright owner conduct in a manner consistent with the country’s
copyright policies. If the interests of the countries involved are difthe Internet. The term “server test” is derived from “serving the content.” The test
does not create personal jurisdiction in the jurisdiction where the servers are located; it
points to the party that serves the infringing content on the Internet as the infringer. 416 F.
Supp. 2d 828, 839, 843 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Case C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v.
Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. 90, ¶ 36 (“[T]he place of
establishment of [a search engine] server cannot, by reason of its uncertain location, be
considered to be the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred for the
purpose of the application of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001.”).
US courts have found jurisdiction based on the place of a server—for example when
the server itself was the location of the tortious conduct or of its effects, e.g., the location
of misappropriation of trade secrets that were stored on the server, such as in
MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 726–27 (2d Cir. 2012), or the location of the
unauthorized use of the server that resulted in damages, such as in Intercon, Inc. v. Bell
Atlantic Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000).
99
E.g., Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 320; Ginsburg, supra note 67, at
153. Cf. Rothchild, supra note 96, at 926–29 (commenting on the “ease of evading
detection”); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 535 (referring to the digital world as a world
“where geography holds less significance”). See also Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1203–26
(arguing that cyberspace is not a borderless medium and discussing filtering in 1998 as a
“technology [that] is relatively new and still relatively crude”).
100
See Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1235–36 (pointing out that difficulties with
localization are not limited to cyberspace but appear in the offline world as well); Graeme
W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright
Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 25 (1999) (“[I]n transnational law,
the concept of the place of harm is relatively easy to manipulate.”).
101
The policy includes the country’s decision on who the copyright owner is.
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ferent, the interests of an alleged infringer’s country in protecting
users’ interests will not be promoted under this rule, nor will be the
interests of that country in regulating (punishing) alleged infringers’ conduct. The rule does not promote the copyright policies of
other jurisdictions where the content is accessed or accessible.
If countries view only one person or entity as the owner of a
particular copyright and agree on the location of his or its domicile,102 the rule of the copyright owner’s domicile enhances the legal certainty of the copyright owner, who can rely on the laws of his
own jurisdiction applying to acts on the Internet, regardless of
where acts of infringement occur and which country’s court decides the case. For an Internet actor, legal certainty will be weaker
than it will be under the rule of the place of the infringing activity’s
origin because under the rule of the copyright owner’s domicile the
actor must determine the identity and domicile of the copyright
owner, and do so under the law of the country of the copyright
owner’s domicile—a country that the actor cannot know until he
identifies who the copyright owner might be.103 An additional complexity arises when multiple owners of the same copyright exist because of countries’ differing rules on copyright ownership.104 Provided that all jurisdictions agree on who the copyright owner is and
where the copyright owner is domiciled, once the Internet actor
determines the country where the copyright owner is domiciled the
actor must familiarize himself with the copyright law of that country, which may be burdensome if the Internet actor deals with multiple copyright-protected works governed by different copyright
laws.
The interoperability of the rule of the copyright owner’s domicile with the current rules of personal jurisdiction is less harmonious than is the interoperability of the rule of the place of the infringement’s origin with the current rules of personal jurisdiction.
Unless the copyright owner’s and alleged infringer’s domiciles are
the same country, the court most familiar with the applicable law—
the court of the country of the copyright owner’s domicile—has
102

Countries’ rules governing copyright ownership and domicile may differ. See supra
Introduction.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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only specific jurisdiction and can adjudicate infringement only
within its own country. The court of general jurisdiction—the
court of the country of the alleged infringer’s domicile—will have
to apply foreign law (the law of the copyright owner’s domicile) to
adjudicate worldwide infringement. While the advantage of applying a single country’s law to cover infringements worldwide exists
under this rule just as it does under the rule that localizes infringement in the place of origin of the alleged infringement, the disadvantage under this rule is that the court having jurisdiction to decide worldwide infringement must apply foreign law.
The rule of the place of the copyright owner’s domicile has not
found its place in copyright law but commentators have entertained
the rule as a theoretically sound possibility. Jane Ginsburg explained the reasoning behind the rule, which recognizes that “the
harm goes to the author’s personality (violation of moral rights),
and to her pocket (violation of economic rights).”105 Graeme Austin characterized the rule as the result of “a reconceptualization of
transnational copyright infringement as harm to domestic economic interests,”106 and Andrew Guzman argued that “residence and
domicile . . . [t]o the extent that they are closely related to the location of effects . . . may serve as proxies for effects”107 of copyright infringement.
A rule that would point to the law of the place of the origin of
the work108 could be regarded as a version of this approach under
the assumption that the place of origin of the work is also the place
where the harm accrues. As Silke von Lewinski noted, the principle
of country of origin appeared in one international copyright treaty,
the Convention of Montevideo on Literary and Artistic Property of
105

Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 41. See also Jane C. Ginsburg & Myriam
Gauthier, The Celestial Jukebox and Earthbound Courts: Judicial Competence in the
European Union and the United States Over Copyright Infringements in Cyberspace, 173
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 85, 135 (1997) (“One might . . . contend
that copyright infringement, and particularly moral rights infringement, implicate
personal rights; the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ with respect to personal
rights would be the place where the copyright owner/author feels the harm, that is at the
place of her domicile.”).
106
Austin, supra note 100, at 26; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New
Foundations, 90 GEO. L. J. 883, 920 (2002).
107
Guzman, supra note 106, at 920.
108
Austin, supra note 7, at 592.
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11 January 1889, which today has been superseded by other more
widely-adopted copyright treaties.109 Some critics argue that one of
the other treaties, the Berne Convention, precludes the rule of the
place of origin of the work because Article 5(2) of the Convention
includes a provision that some interpret as a choice-of-law provision pointing to the law of the protecting country (“the country
where protection is claimed”).110 The provision disallows the application of the law of the country of origin to “the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress,” but the provision seems
to leave open the possibility that the law of the country of the copyright owner’s domicile will apply as long as the country can be
identified as the protecting country “where protection is
claimed.”111
The choice-of-law rule of the place of the copyright owner’s
domicile has a parallel in the law of defamation. The “multiple
publication rule” in defamation is consistent with the traditional
notion of choice of law for copyright infringement because the rule
“treats each communication of defamatory matter to a recipient as
a separate publication,”112 thus allowing for a multiplicity of applicable laws and available litigation fora because, for the purposes of
defamation, publication occurs every time “defamatory matter is
communicated . . . to one other than the person defamed.”113 The
contrary rule is the “single publication rule,” which views the tort
of defamation as occurring in only one place—the place where the
plaintiff suffers harm from defamation; the single publication rule
is a rule that resembles the law of the place of a copyright owner’s
domicile.114 In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws instructs courts to apply in defamation cases the
law of the state of the plaintiff’s domicile if it was also a place of

109

See SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 7 (2008).
Commentators have debated whether Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is a
choice-of-law provision. See e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 129 (2010).
111
Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(2).
112
David Rolph, Splendid Isolation? Australia as a Destination for “Libel Tourism”, 19
AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 79, 85 (2012).
113
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1965).
114
See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Transnational Libel, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 71, 78 (2012).
110
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publication.115 The rule operates alongside the “single publication
rule,” which is formulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and also in the Uniform Single Publication Act,116 and which allows
only one cause of action to be brought for publication that reaches
multiple jurisdictions; the action then covers the entire harm
caused by the publication.117
A sign has emerged that the “single publication rule” (or the
single place of harm rule) might be transferred to the realm of copyright law as one court has recently indicated its willingness to localize the place of harm in the copyright owner’s domicile. The
Court of Appeals of New York, in response to a question certified
by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in American
Buddha,118 held that in a case of copyright infringement that occurred on the Internet the location of the copyright owner’s injury
was the residence or location of the principal place of business of
the copyright holder.119 The Court of Appeals of New York opined
that in the case of online infringement “identifying the situs of injury is not as simple as turning to the place where plaintiff lost
business because there is no singular location that fits that description,”120 and although the Court of Appeals did not explicitly so
state, it seemed that the court might consider the place of the copyright owner (the copyright owner’s place of residence or its principal place of business) to be the only place of injury in an online
copyright infringement case.

115

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150(2)–(3) (1971). If the domicile
of the plaintiff and the place of publication do not coincide, courts will apply the law of
the state or country with “the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties.”
116
9C U.L.A. 173 (1952).
117
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4) (1965). For a discussion of the
“single publication rule” in the United Kingdom and Australia see, for example,
MATTHEW COLLINS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET 346–47 (3d ed.
2010).
118
Penguin Grp. v. American Buddha, 921 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2011).
119
Id. at 174. On the limitation of the holding to cases of uploading content on the
Internet, see Troma Entm’t, Inc. v. Centennial Pictures Inc., 729 F.3d 215, 220 (2d Cir.
2013) (declining to extend the holding in American Buddha to a case in which no
uploading or making available on the Internet was alleged).
120
American Buddha, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
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The New York Court of Appeals’ holding in American Buddha
was limited to the localization of the injury for the purposes of personal jurisdiction (long-arm jurisdiction), thus subjecting the operation of the rule in the context of personal jurisdiction to the additional safeguards that the personal jurisdiction inquiry in the United States involves.121 On remand one of the additional safeguards
(the requirement of substantial revenue drawn from interstate or
international commerce) prevented the court in the copyright owner’s principal place of business from having personal jurisdiction.122
The outcome in American Buddha was therefore consistent with
the current US court practice (discussed later)123 of limiting personal jurisdiction in cases involving acts on the Internet.124
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has also attempted to pinpoint the place of injury on the Internet. In
eDate and Martinez125 the CJEU ruled that a plaintiff in a case concerning personality rights has the option of filing in a court of general jurisdiction (as regards all damages caused) either in the place
of the defendant (the publisher) or in the place “in which the centre of [the victim’s] interests is based.”126 Additionally, the plaintiff can sue in courts of specific jurisdiction (where “content placed
online is or has been accessible”),127 but only as to the damage
caused in the country of that court. Commentators questioned
whether the approach that the CJEU adopted in the cases concerning personality rights could also apply in cases of copyright infringement on the Internet128 and open up the possibility of general
jurisdiction in the place of the copyright owner’s domicile. A sub121

Id. at 177.
Penguin Grp. (USA), v. American Buddha, No. 09 CIV. 528 RA, 2013 WL 865486,
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013).
123
See infra Part III.B.
124
Cf. American Buddha, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 176 (“[T]he absence of any evidence of the
actual downloading of Penguin’s four works by users in New York is not fatal to a finding
that the alleged injury occurred in New York.”).
125
Joined Cases C-509/09 & C-161/10, eDate Adver. GmbH v. X; Martinez v. MGN
Ltd., [2011] E.C.R. I-10269.
126
Id. ¶ 1.
127
Id.
128
There is precedent for extending CJEU rulings concerning personality rights to
copyright infringement cases. See Case C–68/93, Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995
E.C.R. I–00415.
122
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sequent CJEU decision in a trademark case129 did not answer the
question for copyright cases; in Wintersteiger the CJEU ruled that
the approach adopted for infringements of personality rights did
not apply in cases concerning infringements of a registered trademark.130
Two CJEU cases have raised the issue of localization of copyright-infringing acts on the Internet. Pinckney, decided by the CJEU
in 2013, concerned the sale of CDs on the Internet and confirmed
that specific jurisdiction exists based on the accessibility of copyright infringing content on the Internet.131 In Pinckney, the jurisdiction where the content was accessible also happened to be the domicile of the copyright owner; however, the CJEU rejected the
proposition that the damage caused could be the sole basis for general jurisdiction.132 In Hejduk,133 a case pending before the CJEU,
the plaintiff is asking the CJEU to augment its Pinckney decision by
recognizing that some damages on the Internet cannot be localized—such as the damages in the plaintiff’s case in which photographs were posted on the Internet without the plaintiff’s permission or a license134—and that a copyright owner should have the
option, as a plaintiff does in a personality right suit under eDate, to
bring a suit in the place of his own domicile for all damages caused.
Whether the CJEU will depart from Pinckney for the purposes of
damages that are not localizable remains to be seen; the Advocate
General assigned to the case recommended that there not be an
extension of the eDate approach to copyright.135
Even if the place of the copyright owner’s domicile is considered to be the place of injury for purposes of jurisdictional analysis, and even if courts in that place are allowed to serve as courts of
general jurisdiction, this result does not automatically mean that
129

Case C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v. Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH,
2012 E.C.R. 90.
130
Id. ¶ 24. The trademark owner can sue in the country of the trademark registration
or in the place of the defendant’s domicile.
131
Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 E.C.R. 400 ¶ 45, 45.
132
Id.
133
Case C-441/13, Hejduk v. EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 2212 16,
(opinion of AG Villalón).
134
Id.
135
Id. ¶ 27.
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the courts would apply a single law—the law of the copyright owner’s domicile—to infringements in multiple countries. EU choiceof-law rules instruct courts in the EU to apply “the law of the
country for which protection is claimed”;136 US courts will apply
the law of the country with “the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties.”137 Arguably, both of these rules could
be interpreted in a manner that would allow for the application of
the law of the country of the copyright owner’s domicile; protection could be claimed for the country of the copyright owner, which
could also be deemed the country with the most significant relationship to the infringement and the parties. But neither rule suggests that a court must apply a single copyright law to infringements worldwide.
B. Factors Approach
Under the factors approach, courts determine applicable law by
weighing multiple factors;138 the approach was developed in response to criticism of rigid choice-of-law rules, such as lex loci delicti. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws adopted this approach139 but US courts have not applied the approach to copyright
infringements, resorting instead to the traditional lex loci delicti
rule.140 However, two sets of proposed principles for conflict-oflaws rules in IP cases—the ALI Principles141 and the CLIP Principles142—suggest that courts follow a factors approach in cases of
136
Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007
on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) art.
8(1) [hereinafter Rome II Regulation].
137
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971).
138
Other rules may involve multiple factors but not their weighing. See supra note 82
and accompanying text for the rule proposed by Jane Ginsburg that involves multiple
factors that affect the choice of applicable law but does not require a court to weigh the
factors.
139
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
140
Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir.
1998) (“On infringement issues, the governing conflicts principle is usually lex loci delicti,
the doctrine generally applicable to torts.”).
141
The American Law Institute’s Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction,
Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes were adopted and promulgated in
2007. See ALI Principles, supra note 66.
142
The Max Planck Institute Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property
published its Principles (the “CLIP Principles”) in 2013. See CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note
38.
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copyright infringement and use the approach to narrow the number
of applicable copyright laws in cases of infringements occurring in
multiple countries.143 In addition to the two sets of principles,
another proposal could imply some weighing of various factors in
searching for a single applicable copyright law: Paul Geller’s proposal, articulated in his articles from 1996 and 2000,144 suggested
that the focus of the choice-of-law analysis be on “consequences
for judicial remedies”145 and lead to the application of the law of
the “country of the targeted market.”146 In some instances the
identification of the country of the targeted market would require a
weighing of several factors.
The ALI and CLIP principles include special provisions that
apply to infringements on the Internet, and the application of the
provisions can lead to a single copyright law applying to acts on the
Internet.147 Although the drafters of both sets of principles designed the special provisions to concern ubiquitous environments
in general, it is clear that if adopted, the special provisions would
apply primarily on the Internet:148 The comment to the ALI Principles’ provision concerning choice of law in “cases of ubiquitous
infringement” lists “distribution of a work on the Internet” as the
only example.149 A comment on the CLIP Principles’ provision explains that the provision was motivated by situations that arise on
143

Because the focus of this Article is on the problem of the multiplicity of copyright
laws on the Internet, this section analyzes only the provisions of the proposals that pertain
to the solutions to the multiplicity problem. However, it should be noted that by
providing principles for jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments, the proposals present coherent conflict-of-laws systems with their
own sophisticated internal consistency, and therefore an analysis of any individual
provision of the proposals must take into consideration the entire system in which the
provision ought to operate. For a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the ubiquitous
infringement provisions of the two sets of principles see MATULIONYTĖ, supra note 7, at
166–202.
144
Geller, supra note 67, at 125. For a critique of Geller’s proposal from 1996, see
Reindl, supra note 2, at 815–18.
145
Geller, supra note 67, at 125.
146
Id. at 129.
147
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 (“Law or Laws to Be Applied in Cases of
Ubiquitous Infringement”); CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603(1).
148
“[The term ‘ubiquitous’] is clearly expected to cover Internet infringements.”
MATULIONYTĖ, supra note 7, at 178.
149
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt. a.
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the Internet;150 another comment lists the Internet as the only example of ubiquitous media to which the provision applies,151 and a
note to the provision explains that the Principles adopt a narrow
definition of “ubiquitousness” that very likely results in the special
“ubiquitous infringement” provision applying if not only to than
certainly primarily to online cases.152
The special provision of the ALI Principles directs courts to
apply the “law or laws of the State or States with close connections
to the dispute” and provides a demonstrative list of factors that
may be considered to determine the close connections: the place of
residence of the parties, the center of the parties’ relationship, the
“extent of the activities and the investment of parties,” and “the
principal markets toward which the parties directed their activities.”153 A comment on the provision explains that the choice of
factors reflects that the purpose of IP rights is “to create incentives
to innovate”154 and that the factors should therefore lead to the
countries “most closely connected to that objective.”155 The focus
on the center of the parties’ relationship, if a relationship between
the parties exists, is justified by the need for legal certainty and the
preference for parties’ ability to predict the law applicable to IP
rights when they enter the relationship.156
The special provision of the CLIP Principles also calls for the
application of the “law of the State having the closest connection
with the infringement” in cases of “ubiquitous infringement.”157
The examples of the factors that a court should consider in determining the state with the closest connection are the “infringer’s
habitual residence,” “the infringer’s principal place of business,”
“the place where substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out,” and “the place
150

The provision is “motivated by the attempt to balance the interest in efficient
enforcement in the volatile environment of digital media with the need to offer safeguards
to ensure that alleged infringers’ rights are not substantially curtailed.” CLIP PRINCIPLES,
supra note 38, at art. 3:603 cmt. 3:603.C02.
151
Id. at art. 3:603 cmt. 3:603.C09.
152
Id. at art. 3:603 n.3:603.N19.
153
Id.
154
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt. a.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art 3:603(2).

2015]

A MULTIPLICITY OF COPYRIGHT LAWS

377

where the harm caused by the infringement is substantial in relation to the infringement in its entirety.”158
The special provisions in both the ALI and CLIP Principles include an escape clause that provides for the possibility of a carveout from the application of the selected applicable law or laws; the
escape clause allows the parties to prove for any country covered
by the action that the law in that country differs from the selected
law.159 Under the ALI Principles, if a party proves the differences,
“[t]he court shall take into account such differences in determining
the scope of liability and remedies.”160 Under the CLIP Principles,
if a party proves that “the rules applying in a State or States covered by the dispute differ from the law applicable to the dispute in
aspects which are essential for the decision,” “the court shall apply
the different national laws unless this leads to inconsistent results,
in which case the differences should be taken into account in fashioning the remedy.”161
In addition to limiting the number of countries whose laws apply, the principles also aim to limit the number of countries in
which an Internet actor can be brought to court. While both sets of
principles recognize the general jurisdiction of certain courts, they
limit the courts that have specific jurisdiction over the alleged infringer. The ALI Principles limit specific jurisdiction (the jurisdiction of the court of the “State in which the . . . activities give rise
to an infringement claim”162 and the state of which the defendant is
not a resident) to cases in which the alleged infringer “directed
those activities to that State.”163 The CLIP Principles limit specific
jurisdiction in a similar manner; an alleged infringer cannot be sued
in a court of a state when “he has not acted in that State to initiate
158

Id.
For a detailed analysis of the escape clauses in the Proposals see MATULIONYTĖ,
supra note 7, at 183–86.
160
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321(2).
161
CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603(3).
162
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 204(2).
163
Id. § 204(2). The commentary first explains that the rule applies an objective
standard (“[t]he question is whether it is reasonable to conclude from the defendant’s
behavior that defendant sought to enjoy the benefits of engaging with the forum”) and
then the commentary provides examples of facts that may evidence the defendant’s
directing his acts at the forum. See id. § 204 & cmt.
159
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or further the infringement and her or his activity cannot reasonably be seen as having been directed to that State.”164
While they limit instances of specific jurisdiction, the principles
expand the scope of jurisdiction of some courts with specific jurisdiction by allowing the courts, in some very limited circumstances,
to decide infringements that the alleged infringer committed anywhere in the world, not only in the countries where the courts sit.
The ALI Principles provide an exception in cases where there is no
WTO member state (membership in the WTO ensures a certain
level of copyright protection)165 in which general jurisdiction over
an alleged infringer can be established. In such cases the ALI Principles allow a court with specific jurisdiction to decide claims without territorial limitations if the alleged infringer “directed his activities to that State,” and the alleged infringer “solicits or maintains
contacts, business, or an audience in that State on a regular basis,
whether or not such activity initiates or furthers the infringing activity.”166 The CLIP Principles make an exception to the territorial
limitation on specific jurisdiction in instances in which the infringing activity has no substantial effect in a state where general jurisdiction over the alleged infringer exists; in such instances, a court
with specific jurisdiction may also decide infringements in countries other than the court’s country, if the “substantial activities in
furtherance of the infringement” were performed entirely in the
court’s country or the harm caused there is “substantial in relation
to the infringement in its entirety.”167
The factors approach should be the champion of promoting the
“right” copyright policies; by selecting particular factors for courts
to weigh the approach’s designers steered the choice of applicable
law toward the law of the country that in a given case has the prevailing interest in having its copyright law applied, or alternatively—in the words of the comparative impairment analysis—the
country whose interests would be more impaired if its law were not
164

CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 2:202. The targeting approach to the
limitation of personal jurisdiction is consistent with court practices in a number of
countries, as discussed infra in Part III.B.
165
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.
166
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 204(3).
167
CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 2:203.
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applied.168 It can be debated whether the results are different when
courts use the factors approach instead of rigid rules based on localization.169 Critics of the localization approach argue that when applying localization-based rules courts often use escape devices,
such as creative assessments of the location of an infringing act, to
achieve the application of the law of the country that best reflects
the courts’ own policy preferences.170 For these critics, factors approaches merely legitimize the outcomes of the courts’ actual decision-making processes.171
The two sets of Principles explored in this section show different policy emphases.172 The ALI Principles emphasize that the
choice of applicable law provides legal certainty for parties with a
pre-existing relationship;173 when such a relationship is absent, as is
typical in infringement cases, the choice of law under the ALI Principles should promote the policy of creating incentives to innovate.174 The emphasis on incentives to innovate (or create) reflects
the common-law utilitarian notion of copyright as expressed in the
IP clause of the US Constitution, according to which copyright
should “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”175
The CLIP Principles do not declare a preference for a law that
provides the most effective incentives to create, which is unders168

On the attempts to draft choice-of-law rules or factors in a policy-neutral fashion see
generally Trimble, supra note 8.
169
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts: Why Plaintiffs Win and
Should, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 380 (2012) (showing that “[t]he [studied] cases [decided
by courts that have abandoned the lex loci delicti rule] are almost evenly split . . .
between applying the law of the place of conduct and the law of the place of injury.”).
170
See id. at 381 (comparing how the decisions by courts that have abandoned the lex
loci delicti rule would have been different “[i]f the . . . cases had been decided under the
traditional lex loci delicti rule.”).
171
“[R]esult-selectivity is an integral element of the positive conflict of laws and that
recognition of the need for sound outcomes in multistate cases is growing, especially in
areas that have been the subject of important domestic reforms, such as family and tort
law. Openly or covertly, the better law principle now permeates case law, statutes and
conventions.” FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 191
(1993).
172
See supra notes 144 & 145 and accompanying text (detailing Paul Geller’s preference
for effective enforcement, which translates into his approach’s focus on the
“consequences for judicial remedies”).
173
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321 cmt. a.
174
Id.
175
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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tandable given the provenance of the CLIP Principles and also given their authors’ desire to present a set of principles that would be
universally acceptable to countries with varying IP philosophies.
Although the CLIP Principles list choice-of-law factors only demonstratively, and they count on courts to apply other or additional factors as they deem fit, the factors that the authors selected as
examples are indicative of certain policy preferences. Three of the
listed factors concentrate on the infringer’s domicile and the place
of the “substantial activities” of the infringer,176 and therefore the
factors resemble the rule that localizes the infringement in the
place of the alleged infringing activity’s origin.177 Their selection of
the factors leaves the impression that the CLIP Principles’ drafters
give preference to the law of the country that has an interest in regulating the alleged infringer’s conduct. However, the Principles
list the three factors only as examples and add a fourth factor pointing to the place of harm, meaning that courts could still apply the
law of another country as long as it is the law with the “closest
connection with the infringement”;178 in this manner the Principles
presumably allow sufficient leeway for courts to instill in their
choice-of-law analyses the IP philosophy of their particular jurisdiction.
While at least in theory it assists the promotion of the “right”
policy, the factors approach seems to be detrimental to legal certainty. The localization approach, of course, may share this flaw;
localization in the place of the copyright owner and localization in
the place of the alleged infringing activity’s origin present their
own pitfalls for legal certainty.179 However, the factors approach
involves even greater uncertainty because the choice of law depends on the weighing of factors that will necessarily reflect the
subjective assessments and preferences of individual adjudicating
courts. Critics of the localization approach may argue that legal certainty is not in any more jeopardy under the factors approach than
it is under the localization approach; the critics may contend that
the localization approach, combined with various escape devices,
176
177
178
179

CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603(2).
See supra Part II.A.1.
CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603(2).
See supra Part II.A.1 & II.A.2.
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provides as much flexibility for a court’s choice-of-law analysis as
does the factors approach.
Because the choice of applicable law will be case-specific and
dependent on courts’ individual assessments, it should be difficult
to predict the alignment of either of the Principles with the rules of
personal jurisdiction. However, if the factors for choice of law reflect many of the same facts and occurrences that influence the results of the personal jurisdiction analysis,180 it is very likely that the
outcome of the choice-of-law analysis will align well with the application of the rules of personal jurisdiction. A court of general jurisdiction that follows the ALI Principles can easily locate “close
connections to the dispute” in the country of the alleged infringer,181 which will allow the court to choose its own law as applicable
to all infringements. A court with specific jurisdiction based on the
alleged infringer’s activities directed at the country that gave rise to
an infringement claim182 will be able to apply its own law to infringements occurring in its country because the court will identify
close connections based on the infringer’s activities directed at its
country.183 Even in the exceptional cases in which the ALI Principles allow a court of specific jurisdiction to decide claims arising
anywhere in the world the court could legitimately apply its own
country’s law.184 Choice-of-law analyses in courts of general and
specific jurisdiction applying the CLIP Principles would likely have
the same outcomes;185 if courts use the CLIP Principles they will
also likely apply the law with which they are most familiar—the
forum law.
180

See Th. M. De Boer, Facultative Choice of Law: The Procedural Status of Choice-of-Law
Rules and Foreign Law, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 393–94 (1997) (discussing the “co-ordination—or rather
subordination” of the choice of law to the choice of jurisdiction).
181
See CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603.N19–20 (explaining that the factors
that will play a role in the choice will be the place of residence of the parties and the
extent of the parties’ activities and investment).
182
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 204(2).
183
See CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603.N19–20.
184
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 204(3).
185
See supra notes 157 & 158 and accompanying text (on the CLIP Principles’ choice-oflaw rules), note 164 (on the CLIP Principles’ limitation of specific jurisdiction), and note
167 (on the CLIP Principles’ exception to the territorial limitation on specific
jurisdiction).
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Finally, factors approaches are not immune to the same criticism that pertains to the localization approaches: problems with
localizing facts and occurrences on the Internet.186 However, localization problems—to the extent that they do arise—should be less
detrimental to the factors approach than they are to the localization
approach; while the localization approach relies entirely on the localization of a single fact or occurrence, the factors approach uses
the location of several facts or occurrences.187 Additionally, as
noted earlier, concerns about localization may be waning in light of
technological developments.188
C. Copyright Infringement as a Single-Place Tort
The primary hurdle for the proposed conflict-of-laws solutions
to the multiplicity problem is countries’ aversion to the notion of
copyright infringement as a single-place tort, i.e., a tort that is perceived to have occurred (or to be centered) in one place and amenable to adjudication under a single country’s law notwithstanding
the fact that it has effects in other countries.189 An example of a
single-place tort subject to one country’s applicable law is a car accident. Although the interests of multiple countries may be implicated (e.g., parties from countries A and B collide in country C
while driving cars manufactured in countries D and E), a court will
choose and apply a single country’s law to adjudicate the tort even
if the tort’s effects arise in multiple countries (e.g., the parties’ in186

See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text.
Even localization approaches may offer alternatives to particular places that courts
cannot localize—for instance, some jurisdictions may enable courts to localize domicile in
multiple places (e.g., general jurisdiction over businesses and legal entities), and courts
can accept various acts to determine the location of the infringing activity (e.g., in cases of
sales on the Internet courts may select multiple places as places of infringement). See, e.g.,
Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 61, at art. 63 (providing three possible
definitions of a domicile of “a company or other legal person or association of natural or
legal persons”).
188
See supra notes 99 and 100 and accompanying text.
189
It is important to remember that “copyright infringement” in this context describes
a single act resulting in the violation of the laws of multiple countries. For example, the
posting of a work on the Internet may be, depending on the country, the infringing act of
making available to the public, and/or public performance, and/or public display. For the
difference between a multi-place tort and a multiple tort, see MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD,
CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 216 (2003) (explaining how a
situation can be regarded both as a multi-local tort and a multiple tort).
187
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juries were treated in countries A, B, and C, and the parties incurred additional costs associated with the accident in countries A
and B, such as the repair or replacement of their cars).190
As opposed to negligence leading to a car accident or the intentional tort of battery, which are single-place torts, copyright infringement is traditionally a multi-place tort;191 if an act causes effects in multiple countries, the law of each country where the effects accrued—where copyrights under the countries’ laws were
infringed—applies to the act (or its effects) within that country. As
opposed to the car accident and battery, which create an obligation
considered to have vested in a single place (in a single country), an
act of copyright infringement causes harm in multiple places (countries) and creates obligations in each of the multiple countries. Only if countries were to agree to re-conceptualize copyright infringement as a single-place tort could the conflict-of-laws solutions in the previous sections succeed; only then could courts
choose and apply one country’s law to acts of copyright infringement with effects everywhere and decide remedies for the harm
suffered everywhere.
The reason commentators give for copyright infringement being a multi-place tort is that the principle of territoriality so dictates. Under the territoriality principle a country’s copyright law
governs copyright matters only within the reach of the country’s
prescriptive jurisdiction.192 This principle does not distinguish
copyright law from other types of national laws—including general
tort laws—which typically also do not reach beyond a country’s
own prescriptive jurisdiction. What makes copyright law different
from other types of national laws is that it creates an intangible object of property that, because of the principle of territoriality, extends everywhere within the reach of an individual country’s pre190

More than one country’s law may apply in the case if the court uses depeçage and
applies different countries’ laws to certain acts and facts. However, each time it will be
only one country’s law that will apply to any given act and fact.
191
Another term used to describe this characteristic is “multi-local tort.” See VAN
EECHOUD, supra note 189, at 215.
192
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES,
LAW, AND PRACTICE 99 (2013); see also Trimble, supra note 8 (discussing the difference
between the reach of a country’s prescriptive jurisdiction and the effective territorial
scope of the country’s substantive laws).
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scriptive jurisdiction; copyright thus operates as a piece of virtual
immovable property193 that stretches across the entire territory of
the country’s prescriptive jurisdiction.194 Just as courts under traditional choice-of-law rules have applied the law of the country of the
place of immovable property (lex rei sitae) in cases of torts that
caused injury to the property,195 so have courts applied the law of
the protecting country—the law that created the violated copyright
at issue and thus where the copyright was infringed—to copyright
infringements. Consistently with the view that copyright was akin
to immovable property, courts also considered copyright infringement to be a local and not a transitory cause of action, and therefore they refused to adjudicate copyright infringement claims arising under foreign laws.196
There are two problems with using the traditional choice-of-law
rule for immovable property in cases involving copyright. The first
problem is that, because of its intangible nature and its international harmonization, copyright as an object of property typically exists
simultaneously in multiple countries. While a few pieces of immovable property might stretch across a national border (and very few
might extend over two national borders) and therefore two (or
three) countries’ laws might apply to the property, copyright as an
object of property almost always exists simultaneously in multiple
countries. Not surprisingly the rule designed for immovable property does not function well under the conditions of a multiplicity of
possibly applicable laws that typically arise in cases of copyright
infringements on the Internet. The second problem is that choiceof-law rules concerning immovable property have evolved: courts
have accepted the proposition that certain tort claims concerning
193

Cf. Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, [2014] BCSC 1063, ¶ 26 (Can.) (“The plaintiffs’
intellectual property at the heart of the underlying action is movable property.”).
194
Cf. 3 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[C]
(“[A] copyright . . . has no situs apart from the domicile of its proprietor.”); James Y.
Stern, Property, Exclusivity, and Jurisdiction, 100 VA. L. REV. 111, 170–71 (2014) (“[I]n a
sense, one may say [copyright and patent] are governed by a situs rule, and their situs is
federal territory.”).
195
See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 609 (8th ed. 2001);
G.C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1199 (14th ed. 2008).
196
See, e.g., Peter D. Trooboff, Intellectual Property, in TRANSNATIONAL TORT
LITIGATION: JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES 125 (Campbell McLachlan & Peter Nygh eds.,
1996).
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immovable property are transitory causes of action,197 and modern
choice-of-law approaches have departed from the traditional strict
lex rei sitae rule for some claims involving immovable property.198
Some relaxation of the rules has also occurred for copyright, although the relaxation happened later for copyright than it did for
immovable property.199 First, some courts have accepted the notion
that copyright infringement is a transitory cause of action. In 1984
in London Film the US District Court for the Southern District of
New York found that it had jurisdiction over claims of copyright
infringement that arose under the copyright laws of foreign countries.200 The UK Supreme Court cited London Film for its finding
in its 2011 Lucasfilm judgment that copyright is a transitory cause
of action in England.201 Second, some countries have undertaken
small departures from the dictate of lex loci protectionis—the copyright version of lex rei sitae: new acts on private international law in
China and Switzerland now allow parties to a copyright infringement dispute to agree (after an occurrence of infringement) on the
law applicable to the infringement.202 Finally, countries have recently agreed to recognize, in limited circumstances, the status of a
work or a copy of a work based on a foreign country’s law. The
2012 EU Orphan Works Directive203 provides for mutual recognition of the orphan work status in all EU member countries once the
197

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 87 (1971); see also, e.g.,
Stephen Lee, Title to Foreign Real Property in Transnational Money Claims, 32 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 607, 641–57 (1995) (analyzing ways in which tort claims involving
immovable property can be reframed to become transitory causes of action).
198
E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147 (1971); Rome II
Regulation, supra note 136, at art. 4(3), 7.
199
See also Rita Matulionytė, Calling for Party Autonomy in Intellectual Property
Infringement Cases, 9 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 77, 84 (2013).
200
London Film Productions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F.
Supp. 47, 48–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Creative Technology Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE,
61 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995).
201
Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39, ¶ 84, 109.
202
BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG] [PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW] Dec. 18, 1987, as amended July 1, 2013, art 110(2) (Switz.); Law of
the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of
China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010,
effective April 1, 2011), art. 50. But cf. Rome II Regulation, supra note 136, at art. 8(3)
(prohibiting an agreement from derogating from the applicable law selected).
203
Council Directive 2012/28, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5.

386

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:339

status is established for a work in one of the EU member countries.204 The 2013 Marrakesh Treaty205 provides for cross-border
exchange of “accessible format copies”206 for use by the visually
impaired,207 and while the Treaty does not use the words “mutual
recognition,” it seems that the system of exchange implies a mutual recognition of the copies’ status as established in other countries-parties to the Treaty.208
Some critics may doubt the importance of these developments
for advancing the relaxation of choice-of-law rules in copyright.
William Patry considers London Film an erroneous decision and
charges that “[i]t is completely wrong to assert that copyright is a
transitory tort.”209 He notes that UK courts have been influenced
by the EU rules that, consistent with civil law practice, allow jurisdiction (competence) over copyright infringements arising under
other countries’ laws.210 The UK Supreme Court decision in Lucasfilm could indeed be interpreted as a natural consequence of UK
membership in the EU and a reflection of the influence of EU rules
on the English legal system. While the acceptance of copyright infringement as a transitory cause of action can be viewed as an important step in the departure from the rules that resemble rules on
immovable property, the fact that copyright infringement is a transitory cause of action does not mean that the choice-of-law rule governing copyright infringement will automatically change from lex
loci protectionis. Allowing parties to select the law applicable to infringement, as the Chinese and the Swiss acts do, could be critically viewed as no more than a move to extend a concept familiar in
arbitration to the civil litigation realm.211 Finally, the importance of
the EU Orphan Works Directive and the Marrakesh Treaty as mi204

Id. at art. 4.
Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 47.
206
Id. at art. 2(b).
207
Id. at art. 5.
208
See generally Marketa Trimble, The Marrakesh Puzzle, 45 IIC 768 (2014) (analyzing
the Treaty and discussing possible implementation tools to help executive and legislative
experts implementing the Treaty).
209
7 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 25:105 (2013).
210
See id.
211
See also infra Part III.A for a discussion of choice-of-law practice and the possibility
that parties to a dispute will not invoke or plead foreign law, thereby agreeing de facto on
the forum law.
205
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lestones in the process of changing views on choice of law in copyright could also be questioned; the two instruments do not state
explicitly that they seek to influence choice-of-law rules, and they
provide for mutual recognition in very limited and arguably highly
harmonized spheres.
Notwithstanding these objections the developments described
above can be taken to be signs of a trend towards relaxation of
choice-of-law rules for copyright; the developments are emerging
while there is a need for more efficient cross-border enforcement
and a desire for easier and less costly cross-border transactions. As
Graeme Austin predicted, the desiderata will play important roles
as countries decide whether to change choice of law for copyright
infringements, particularly as they face the additional multiplicity
problem challenges on the Internet.212 If the developments concerning immovable property teach a lesson, it seems that another
development is necessary to convince countries to relax choice-oflaw rules for copyright infringements: countries would need to relinquish their paternalistic approach to copyright in order to accept
the concept of copyright infringement as a single-place tort.213
212

Austin, supra note 7, at 582 (cautioning that “[d]evising a conflict of laws regime for
cyberspace copyright infringement needs to be seen as a task that involves an important
social policy choice, one that requires weighing the advantages of single governing law
approaches—such as more efficient enforcement and licensing of copyrights—against the
costs of allowing domestic copyright laws to be overridden by the copyright laws of other
nations”).
213
See June F. Entman, Abolishing Local Action Rules: A First Step Toward Modernizing
Jurisdiction and Venue in Tennessee, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 251, 260 (2004) (“In addition to,
and perhaps underlying, nineteenth century notions of state court territorial jurisdiction,
courts may have feared loss of local control and ensuing confusion in land titles if
judgments were permitted to directly affect land titles in other states. Insistence upon a
state’s exclusive power to dispense remedies respecting land within its borders provided
the states with protection from sister state adjudications that refused to apply, or
misapplied, situs law.”); Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law and Intellectual Property, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – HEADING FOR THE
FUTURE 129, 148 (Josef Drexl & Annette Kur eds., 2005) (“The character of rights in
intellectual property as state-protected rights, which are both exclusive and economically
sensitive, gives the law in this area a regulatory character, and ensures that every state has
a legitimate interest in the protection of intellectual property rights according to its
laws.”); Graeme W. Austin, Copyright Across (and Within) Domestic Borders, in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 105, 115
(Charles E.F. Rickett & Graeme W. Austin eds., 2000) (“The development of private
international law theories that seek to loosen the connection between copyright and the
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For copyright infringement to be treated as a single-place tort,
with the result that a single country’s law could apply to the infringement worldwide, it would be necessary for countries to consent to have their copyright policies yield, from time to time, to the
copyright policies of other countries. Countries’ objection will be
that copyright policies embed a particular balance of fundamental
rights that countries must not allow to be endangered by permitting
foreign copyright laws to apply. A counter-argument might be that
other laws that apply to single-place torts also reflect fundamental
rights and that it is the public policy exception that provides an escape valve that in conflict of laws (both in choice of law and the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments) protects
fundamental rights.214
Countries may also hesitate to accept the notion of copyright
infringement as a single-place tort because they might be
concerned about enforcement of judgments that would be based on
a single country’s applicable law. This is a concern that countries
share for immovable property; the concern has been one of the
rationales for the local action doctrine, which prevented a court
from issuing a judgment that the court could not enforce because
the court lacked physical power over the immovable property.215
The concern is certainly warranted in cases of registered
intellectual property rights that require a registration by a
country’s agency for their existence. There should be less reason
for this concern in cases of unregistered intellectual property
rights, such as copyright.216

nation state also have much in common with the shift towards the privatisation of
copyright regulation through the institution of contract.”).
214
Critics could argue that the issues in which countries’ copyright laws differ are often
(if not always) precisely those issues that countries cannot harmonize (at all or more
deeply) because the issues reflect differences in the countries’ notions of fundamental
rights. The practice would have to show whether any space remains for issues that are not
yet fully harmonized but that do not exhibit a friction of fundamental rights, meaning a
space in which no harmonization (or no deeper harmonization) has occurred but a space
in which countries are willing to recognize and enforce foreign judgments based on a
foreign country’s law that differs from their own.
215
Fisher v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (E.D. Va. 2003).
216
Under the Berne Convention, countries must require no formalities for copyright
protection. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5(2).
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One case, Viewfinder,217 suggests that the concern about
enforcement might be justified in copyright cases; in Viewfinder a
French court applied the law of a single country—France—to
copyright infringement that arguably could have been claimed to
have occurred in multiple countries simultaneously, including in
the United States.218 While the French court did not explicitly
apply French law to acts that had occurred in the United States, its
judgment de facto did apply French law to acts in the United States
because the posting of the photographs at issue on a website had
occurred in the United States and the injunction that the French
court granted based on French law was therefore directed at
activities in the United States. The plaintiff sought to have the
resulting French judgment recognized in the United States and
enforced against US defendants; however, the US Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the public policy
exception prevented the recognition of the judgment in the United
States if the cause of action would violate the First Amendment.219
The outcome in Viewfinder can be interpreted as confirming
countries’ concerns about treating copyright as a single-place tort
and facing the resulting enforcement difficulties; however, the
outcome can also be interpreted as proving that the public policy
exception is an effective escape valve for the protection of
fundamental rights and other significant public policies. The
existence of the exception should make it easier for countries to
accept copyright infringement as a single-place tort while assuring
countries that they will not have to compromise their fundamental
rights.
The degree of harmonization of copyright law at the
international level (with respect to both scope and depth, and the
number of countries with harmonized copyright laws) should enhance countries’ amenability to shifting to copyright infringement
as a single-place tort.220 The more that copyright laws are harmonized, the fewer will be the differences that will persist in the poli217

Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 477.
219
Id. at 481.
220
Countries’ willingness to relax lex rei sitae in cases of environmental torts may be
influenced by a high degree of environmental law harmonization in the countries. See
Rome II Regulation, supra note 136, at art. 7.
218
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cies that countries promote and the less it will be that countries will
be concerned that foreign law might apply in some cases. While
copyright law might not soon reach a sufficiently deep global harmonization that would lead to a single global copyright standard
(the standard that some commentators have seen as a promising
solution to the multiplicity problem),221 the law could much sooner
reach a level of harmonization that would make countries comfortable with a shift to the notion of copyright infringement as a singleplace tort.
Finally, some critics might argue that conflict-of-laws approaches would lead to a result that is worse than a single global
copyright solution because the approaches allow one country to
dictate copyright law for other countries without allowing the other
countries to shape the law.222 It is important to remember though,
that as opposed to the single global copyright law approaches, conflict-of-laws approaches affect only cross-border scenarios; domestic scenarios continue to be governed by the national laws of individual countries. Comity should ensure that countries will see their
laws applied whenever there is a legitimate reason for the laws to
apply, and the public policy exception safeguards fundamental
rights and other significant public policies.
III.

REALITIES AFFECTING THE MULTIPLICITY OF
COPYRIGHT LAWS ON THE INTERNET
The existing proposals that attempt to address the multiplicity
of copyright laws on the Internet have not found their way into national legislation or international treaties, but some courts have already looked at the proposals when deciding cases involving the
multiplicity problem and have benefited from the wealth of analysis
that the proposals include.223 However, unless major changes in
conflict of laws are undertaken by all or a significant number of
countries in concert, Internet actors will continue to face the multiplicity problem.
221

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.A (discussing countries’ involvement in shaping international law).
223
See supra note 30 (referring to court decisions that cited the ALI and CLIP
Principles).
222
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Commentators have predicted that the multiplicity problem
would be a major hurdle for activities on the Internet, but a cursory
review of copyright cases from the past two decades suggests that
the multiplicity threat has not materialized, at least not in the form
of Internet actors facing global enforcement campaigns pursued
simultaneously under the laws of all countries connected to the Internet. The reasons that Internet actors are not being exposed to
global copyright litigation mayhem dwell in the realities of crossborder copyright litigation, which limit the territorial extent of manageable copyright enforcement, at least for disputes that are litigated, and which are the “mysterious mechanisms” that Peter
Swire observed “are reducing the actual conflicts to a handful of
cases.”224 The following sections discuss the litigation realities that
concern choice of law and personal jurisdiction, and that affect
plaintiffs’ strategies for claiming applicable law and choosing litigation fora; the realities also affect Internet actors’ level of compliance with copyright laws on the Internet.
A. Limitations on Choice of Applicable Law
Notwithstanding the ubiquitous nature of most activities on the
Internet, relatively few disputes advance to courts in which copyright owners claim copyright infringement in multiple countries
and therefore raise infringement claims under the laws of multiple
countries. There are several explanations for why choice-of-law
issues are rare in copyright cases, including cases involving the Internet, and why choice-of-law issues involving more than two countries are even rarer.
Perhaps the most mundane reason for the low frequency of
copyright cases that raise choice-of-law issues is that the issues do
not seem to be recognized by many clients or their counsel. For
clients, Ted De Boer’s observation is fitting that “the average citizen, lacking experience in dealing with multistate legal problems, is
not very sensitive to the problems and solutions of choice-of-law”
and, as a result, “the problem as such escapes him.”225 We might
expect better awareness from lawyers, who should be more cogni224

Peter P. Swire, Elephants and Mice Revisited: Law and Choice of Law on the Internet,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1975 (2005).
225
De Boer, supra note 180, at 298.
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zant than the average citizen of the possibility that the laws of multiple countries could be implicated in a dispute; however, two important limitations exist.
The first limitation is IP-specific and arises from the fact that IP
law practice has traditionally not been viewed as prone to complex
choice-of-law problems; the territoriality principle seemed to clearly delineate the applicability of IP laws, leaving little if anything to
choice-of-law analysis.226 Notwithstanding the fact that as early as
1889 a conflict-of-laws expert authored a comprehensive study of
conflict-of-laws issues in IP,227 and his work was not the only or the
last to address the issues,228 courts and academics at the end of the
twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century have noted
the relative novelty and uniqueness of conflict-of-laws analyses focused on IP cases.229
The second limitation that might explain why at least some
lawyers are not particularly aware of choice-of-law issues in IP cases, and therefore do not always recognize or utilize choice-of-law
226

See Paul Edward Geller, How To Practice Copyright Law Internationally in Perplexing
Times?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 167, 183–85 (2013) (discussing the need to “map
out arguable infringement worldwide”).
227
2 CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, THEORIE UND PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHTS 231–91 (1889).
228
Examples of the twentieth century literature on the topic include ALOIS TROLLER,
DAS INTERNATIONAL PRIVAT- UND ZIVILPROZEßRECHT IM GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ
UND URHEBERRECHT (Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1952); Alois Troller,
Europäisierung des Patentrechts und Gerichtsstand, 1955 GRUR INT. 529; Friedrich Groß,
Wie mache ich im Inland Ansprüche aus Schutzrechten geltend, deren Verletzung im Ausland
erfolgt ist?, 1957 GRUR INT. 346; Otto-Friedrich Frhr. von Gamm, Die internationale und
örtliche Zuständigkeit im gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, 50 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN
PATENTANWÄLTE 212 (1959); Heinz W. Auerswald, Können Ansprüche wegen Verletzung
eines ausländischen Patents vor deutschen Gerichten verfolgt werden?, in FESTSCHRIFT
WERNER VON STEIN 8 (1961); W. R. Cornish, Intellectual Property Infringement and Private
International Law: Changing the Common Law Approach, 1996 GRUR INT. 285; Paul
Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International Copyright, 20
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571 (1996); JAMES J. FAWCETT, PAUL TORREMANS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); Ginsburg, supra
note 38, at 239–406.
229
“The rarity of coordinated studies of copyright and private international law is often
deplored by legal writers representing both these disciplines.” STIG STRÖMHOLM,
COPYRIGHT AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2010) “In spite of
that oft complained scarcity of major contributions to the meeting of intellectual property
and private international law, a complete study of modern legal writing on this topic
would demand a very substantial chapter.” Id. at 60.
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issues in copyright infringement cases, is the same limitation that
exists in other areas of law and is associated with the general plight
of conflict of laws as a subject in US law schools. Although globalization generates more cross-border legal issues today than it ever
has before, and conflict of laws should be one of the most important tools in the toolbox of a modern lawyer,230 only about half of
the US state bar associations test conflict of laws on their bar examinations; with few exceptions conflict of laws courses cover primarily interstate and federal-state conflicts.231 Although courses on
transnational litigation and comparative procedure are helpful additions to the traditional US conflict-of-laws curricula,232 the courses
are too few to educate a sufficient percentage of future lawyers in
the very important field and sensitize them to international issues
and conflicts. A number of law schools now offer a course in international intellectual property law; however, only some of these
courses cover conflict-of-laws problems in any significant detail.233
230

See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws,
International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction (Hague Academy Lectures), 167
RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 321 (1979) (“[T]he study of public international law and the
study of private international law are not just two elements in a well balanced curriculum,
comparable to anatomy and physiology for a medical student.”); Carolyn B. Lamm,
Internationalization of the Practice of Law and Important Emerging Issues for Investor-State
Arbitration: Opening Lecture, Private International Law Session 354 RECUEIL DES COURS 9,
25 (2011) (“The growing interdependence of legal systems has significantly increased the
relevance of private international law and the need for lawyers to acquire international
and comparative law skills.”).
231
Friedrich Juenger cautioned in 1999: “The fact that our discipline has been
preoccupied with domestic choice-of-law problems ought to be of some concern to law
teachers, now that ‘globalization’ has become the cliché of choice and acronyms such as
EU, NAFTA, and WTO are bantered about daily by the media.” Friedrich K. Juenger,
The Need for A Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309–36
(1999).
232
Cyberlaw (or Internet Law) courses also tend to cover some jurisdictional issues. On
the challenges of dealing with copyright cases involving multiple countries’ laws see
Geller, supra note 226.
233
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, (3d ed. 2012); DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE,
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed.
2012); GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND POLICY (2d ed. 2008). Conflict-of-laws issues are also covered to a lesser extent or in
a cursory manner in MARGO A. BAGLEY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND
POLICY (2013); JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY
(3d ed. 2010); FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (2d ed. 2007).
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If neither lawyers nor their clients recognize a cross-border issue,
they will not bring claims under foreign laws and the issue will not
exist.234
Even when a lawyer identifies a cross-border issue and informs
the client about its existence and potential consequences, the lawyer may advise against filing a case in a manner that would present
a choice-of-law issue, or certainly in a manner that would result in
the application of the laws of multiple countries, because litigating
under the laws of multiple countries is challenging and expensive.
Whether the rules of procedure require parties to plead and prove
foreign law, invoke foreign law, submit foreign law for judicial notice,235 or whether courts have an obligation to ascertain foreign law
on their own,236 the inclusion of claims under multiple countries’
laws puts additional pressure on resources that the parties must
expend in litigation. It is likely that parties will have to hire foreign
law experts to analyze foreign law, and sometimes to present the
law to the court.
Another reason lawyers might pause before they file a case under multiple countries’ laws is that courts have a natural hesitancy
to apply the laws of multiple countries in one lawsuit. This hesitancy is understandable; it can be sufficiently complex for a court to
apply foreign law instead of forum law, and dealing with multiple
countries’ laws in a single litigation complicates and prolongs the
proceedings. Sometimes a court may wonder whether litigating
under the laws of fewer countries would serve the plaintiff suffi234

SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 41 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2004) (“Foreign law cannot get into
court if neither the judge nor the parties suggest its relevance to the case at issue.”). Even
if a court has an obligation to conduct a choice-of-law analysis on its own (which is the
case in some jurisdictions) the court will not do so unless the parties raise claims that
implicate a choice-of-law issue. See Carlos Esplugues, General Report on the Application of
Foreign Law by Judicial and Non-Judicial Authorities in Europe, in APPLICATION OF
FOREIGN LAW 18–22 (Carlos Esplugues, José Luis Iglesias & Guillermo Palao eds. 2011)
(on the mandatory and non-mandatory character of choice-of-law rules).
235
Geller, supra note 20, at 333 (“[T]he failure to plead the copyright law of each
country impacted by the transactions at issue may preclude a claimant from relying on
this law at a later stage of suit.”).
236
On different approaches to foreign law in courts see, for example, De Boer, supra
note 180, at 258–66; Esplugues, supra note 234, at 22–30; RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 12–26 (2013); MARTIN
WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 218–23 (2d ed. 1950).
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ciently, and whether the plaintiff is making claims under multiple
countries’ laws to pursue indirect strategic goals. By bringing lawsuits under the copyright laws of too many countries, a lawyer may
risk alienating the court from the outset.237
The third reason for lawyers to limit the number of laws that
they claim will apply to the case is that concentrating litigation under the laws of multiple countries in one venue does not relieve the
plaintiff of the responsibility to prove infringements in all countries
where the plaintiff claims infringements to have occurred. The
laws of most countries require the plaintiff to prove that the alleged
acts were greater than de minimis infringements238 in order for a
court to find the acts in violation of a country’s law, and unless the
particular foreign country’s law provides for statutory damages
that the adjudicating court would be willing to award,239 the plaintiff will also have to prove his lost profits and/or damages in the
foreign country.240
Whether a party brings a claim under multiple countries’ laws
should depend on the result of a careful cost/benefit analysis. The
cost analysis should consider not only litigation expenses241 but also
strategic and reputational costs vis-à-vis the particular court, and—
given the recently increased public sensitivity to large-scale copyright enforcement efforts—also the costs to the image of the copyright owner and his public relations. For the benefit analysis the
prediction of possible rewards242 should be tempered by an assessment of potential difficulties that could be associated with the enforcement of the rewards, particularly if the enforcement might
237

If a plaintiff decides not to claim copyright infringement under the laws of foreign
countries in a lawsuit, his decision should not mean that he waives any claims for
infringements in the foreign countries. Not bringing a lawsuit under the law of a foreign
country does not preclude the bringing of a separate (parallel or subsequent) lawsuit in
the foreign country under that foreign country’s law.
238
A “de minimis” infringement is “a technical violation of a right so trivial that the
law will not impose legal consequences.” Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126
F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997).
239
See, e.g., Austin, supra note 100 (arguing that remedies should be governed by the
laws of the country in which the infringement occurs).
240
Some countries that do not provide for statutory damages have other alternatives to
actual damages, but for these alternative damages some proof may also be necessary.
241
Austin, supra note 7, at 590.
242
Id.

396

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:339

require the recognition and enforcement of the resulting judgment
in a foreign country outside the adjudicating court’s jurisdiction.
Courts do not necessarily shy away from conflict-of-laws issues; they address these issues regularly and from time to time also
apply foreign law. However, courts generally prefer to apply forum
law,243 the law with which they are most familiar; it is a natural
tendency for courts to apply—whenever possible—choice-of-law
rules in a manner that results in the courts applying forum law.244
Courts, when faced with foreign law insufficiently invoked,
pleaded, and/or proven will resort to applying the forum law under
the presumption that the foreign law is identical to the forum
law;245 in such a situation the outcome is identical to the outcome
that would occur if the parties were to agree to have the forum law
apply to their case—notwithstanding the fact that most countries’
laws do not permit parties to agree, post-infringement, on the law
that will be applicable to their copyright infringement case.246
243

De Boer, supra note 180, at 391–93, 402–03; RICHARD FENTIMAN, FOREIGN LAW IN
ENGLISH COURTS 24 (1998); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 530–31; Symeonides, supra note
169, at 380 (noting that “[a]lmost two thirds of the [studied] cases . . . have applied the
law of the forum state”).
244
See CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, at art. 3:603 cmt. 3:603.C14 (“It is not
unrealistic to submit that courts have a certain natural tendency to assume that the law
having the closest connection to a case is the law of the forum.”); Austin, supra note 100,
at 2 (“United States courts have employed a number of choice of law strategies to enable
application of US copyright law to allegations of copyright infringement based on acts that
have occurred abroad.”); Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 533 (“[T]o the extent that US
courts have been willing to localize an international dispute in a single country, they have
invariably localized to the United States and thus have applied US law.”); Austin, supra
note 213, at 112. On courts’ preference for forum law in general see, for example,
Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92
B.U. L. REV. 535, 556 (2012); Laura E. Little, Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression,
and the Lessons of Private International Law for the United States, 14 EUR. Y.B. OF PRIVATE
INT’L LAW 1, 3 (2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2187449.
245
See De Boer, supra note 180, at 313–16. The Reporter’s Note to the ALI Principles
explains that “it may often be fair and reasonable for the court to presume that the
relevant States’ norms are the same as those of the State whose law is chosen to apply”
because of the “increasing harmonization of national intellectual property laws.” ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 66, § 321.
246
See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE
TREATISE ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS LAW, INCLUDING THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 181 (1967) (“American courts have, in innumerable cases, shown their
willingness to accept the parties’ express or implied choice of the lex fori, whether that
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When facing cases involving multiple countries’ laws, common law
courts that apply the forum non conveniens doctrine may apply the
doctrine to dismiss the case as better suited for another, more suitable forum.247 It is therefore not surprising that when plaintiffs
have a choice of forum they tend to file infringement cases in the
courts of the countries whose laws the plaintiffs want to apply; the
practicalities thus promote the choice-of-law rule of lex loci protectionis and the filing of cases in, and under the laws of, the countries
where infringement is claimed.
Unintentionally overlooking or intentionally avoiding a choiceof-law issue that could lead to the application of the laws of multiple countries does not have to be detrimental to the client’s desire
for redress; there are tools that help capture some or all of the acts
in multiple countries. The doctrines of secondary infringement can
cover acts that occur outside the protecting country; for example,
instead of claiming that a defendant’s acts infringed the copyright
law of a foreign country, a plaintiff may be able to claim that the
acts induced infringement of copyright under US copyright law and
as such also infringed US copyright law.248 While induced infringements must occur in the United States, the associated acts of
inducement can occur outside the United States and still be subject
to US copyright law. Requesting profits arising from foreign acts
that can be traced to an infringement in the United States is another way that plaintiffs can obtain redress (even if not complete redress) for acts occurring outside the United States while bringing
the action only under US law.249
choice is made prior to or during litigation.”); see also supra note 202 and accompanying
text on the Chinese and Swiss acts on private international law.
247
See, e.g., Global Use/Territorial Rights, supra note 4, at 334 (noting that litigants in the
United States may argue for dismissals for forum non conveniens if foreign law has to be
interpreted); Austin, supra note 100 (analyzing forum non conveniens issues as they arise in
cross-border copyright cases); FENTIMAN, supra note 243, at 24; Boosey & Hawkes Music
Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 1998) (“While reluctance
to apply foreign law is a valid factor favoring dismissal . . . standing alone it does not
justify dismissal.”); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260 (1981)
(affirming previous Supreme Court jurisprudence that there is “a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home.”).
248
See also Austin, supra note 100, at 9.
249
See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possibility of
receiving an award of foreign profits.
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In many instances remedies obtained in a single country under
that country’s law will provide as much redress as is feasible under
the circumstances and serve the deterrence function. Annette Kur
notes that decisions rendered by one court that apply a single country’s law “more often than not entail global effects, even where they
only purport to pertain to the national territory.”250 Whether it is
indeed “more often than not” is an empirical question worth its
own study, but many decisions indeed have global effects. Injunctions granted by courts applying even a single country’s law may
stop acts worldwide, for example by ordering the takedown of a
work from the Internet. Monetary damages can have global deterrence effects even if they are awarded for infringements in a single
country; although such damages do not remedy harm caused in
other countries, they might be sufficiently high to dissuade an infringer from further similar acts and thus serve the deterrence
function globally.251 To the extent that an infringer’s assets are limited, damages awarded for infringement in one country, if they
match or exceed the infringer’s assets, may entail all that (or more
than) the plaintiff is realistically likely to recover.
B. Limitations on Personal Jurisdiction
The multiplicity problem is also mitigated by the fact that
courts in at least some countries have limited specific jurisdiction
over an Internet actor because courts have circumscribed personal
jurisdiction based on acts committed on the Internet. Multiplicity
critics have assumed that Internet actors would be exposed to multiple copyright laws in two scenarios: In the first scenario, a copyright owner would bring claims of copyright infringement under
multiple copyright laws in the court of an Internet actor’s domicile
(as long as the court considers the claims to be transitory causes of
action it will entertain the action under foreign countries’ laws).
This scenario would require that the court apply multiple copyright
laws—a situation that is associated with the various limitations discussed in the previous section. In the second scenario, the copy250

CLIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, §§ 320–21.
The deterrence function might be served if the law provides for and the court awards
punitive damages. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. However, even when a
country’s law does not provide for punitive damages, the amount of compensatory
damages might be sufficiently high to serve the deterrence function.

251
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right owner would bring claims in all countries where the allegedly
infringing work was accessible, and would bring the claims under
all the respective copyright laws, thus utilizing the specific jurisdiction that the courts in these countries would have based on the accessibility of the work, which accessibility would also make all the
countries the places of the tortious activity.
Many of the reasons for the low incidence of lawsuits that claim
infringements under the laws of multiple countries (discussed in
the previous section) are the same reasons for which the filing of
lawsuits in multiple countries has not been rampant. Many clients
might not even think of the possibility of filing in a foreign court,
and lawyers might not see simultaneous filings in the courts of multiple countries as practical; few clients can afford to file in multiple
countries or are willing to expend the resources necessary to litigate in multiple countries.252 Not only do the costs of litigation in
individual countries add up, but parties must allocate additional
resources to the coordination of enforcement because litigation in
various countries may require the same witnesses and evidence to
be presented in each of the courts and in each language.
Some courts have placed an important limitation on the specific
jurisdiction for cases involving activities on the Internet by requiring that the jurisdiction be based on a defendant’s actual contacts
with the forum. That court jurisdiction would have to be limited for
activities on the Internet in some manner has been clear since the
beginnings of the Internet. In the United States, the Zippo test253
placed a limit on jurisdiction based on activities of Internet websites that were interactive; under the test, courts denied jurisdiction in cases of websites that were purely passive. Although the test
helped to limit jurisdiction, the limitation was insufficient because
interactive websites remained exposed to the potential jurisdiction
of courts worldwide.254 More recent approaches used in the United
States seek to limit jurisdiction by requiring that a defendant have
252

Austin, supra note 100, at 5 (“The prospect of initiating parallel proceedings in each
of the territories in which the infringements took place will likely prove prohibitive in
many instances.”).
253
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
254
Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2010); Case C-585/08,
Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG, 2010 E.C.R. I-12530 ¶ 79 (noting
that the distinction between “interactive” and other websites “is not decisive”).
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actual contacts with the forum;255 under these approaches the mere
possibility of contacts—i.e. pure accessibility alone, even if combined with interactivity—does not create personal jurisdiction.256
Technological advancements assist Internet actors in limiting
their exposure to the jurisdiction of foreign courts and the applicability of foreign laws, if the actors are interested in limiting their
exposure;257 geolocation and geoblocking technologies enable Internet actors to delineate their activities on the Internet in a manner consistent with countries’ physical boundaries by identifying
Internet users’ physical locations and disabling the users’ access to
the content if the Internet actors do not want the users connecting
to the Internet from outside of particular countries to access the
content. Of course technological advancements in geolocation and
255

Tracie E. Wandell, Geolocation and Jurisdiction: From Purposeful Availment to
Avoidance and Trageting on the Internet, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 275, 280–83 (2011).
256
Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie, New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s
Challenges to Jurisdiction, 42 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 1017, 1049 (2011) (“The fact that a
website might be accessed by residents of one jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that
it has been . . . .”); see also, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., No. C 12–01521 WHA,
2013 WL 4777189, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013); Case C-585/08, Pammer v. Reederei
Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG, 2010 E.C.R. I-12530 ¶ 64; Case C-173/11, Football
Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. 1, ¶ 36 (examining these issues in the
context of sui generis database protection); Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack (2014), 374
D.L.R. 4th 1063 ¶ 36 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (“[T]he ability of someone in British Columbia
to open a website created by a person in another country does not of itself give this Court
jurisdiction over the creator of that website.”); Anderson, supra note 114, at 92–95
(examining these issues through the lens of defamation); Laura E. Little, Internet
Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International Law for the
United States, in 14 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2012). For
an early prediction of this outcome see Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1218 (“[T]here is
relatively little reason at present, and even less reason in the near future, to believe that
the mere introduction of information into cyberspace will by itself suffice for personal
jurisdiction over the agent of the transmission in every state where the information
appears.”). Cf. Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 E.C.R. 400 ¶ 42
(“Article 5(3) [of the Brussels I Regulation] does not require . . . that the activity
concerned . . . be ‘directed to’ the Member State in which the court seised is situated.”);
Case C-441/13, Hejduk v. EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 31, (opinion of
AG Villalón).
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Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 1218–19 (“[F]iltering and identification technology
promise greater control at less cost. In cyberspace as in real space, the ultimate meaning
of ‘purposeful availment’ and ‘reasonableness’ will depend on the cost and feasibility of
information flow control. As such control becomes more feasible and less costly, personal
jurisdiction over cyberspace activities will become functionally identical to personal
jurisdiction over real-space activities.”).
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geoblocking are mirrored by advancements in virtual private network technologies that enable Internet users to evade geolocation
and avoid geoblocking, which undermines the effectiveness of geolocation.258 However, installing bona fide and relatively effective
geolocation and geoblocking technologies should help Internet actors protect themselves from the jurisdiction of courts located in
geoblocked countries.
A litigation cost/benefit analysis will lead many small copyright
owners to sue in only one country (often in the country of their
own domicile) so that they may enjoy the benefit of local counsel,
litigation with familiar rules of procedure, and proceedings in their
own language with a potentially sympathetic judge or a jury, and
not have to fear bias in a foreign court against them as a foreign
copyright owner.259 Copyright owners with more resources may
opt to litigate where they can inflict the greatest pain on an alleged
infringer, which will usually be in the place of the alleged infringer’s domicile.260 When the results of the limitations discussed in
the previous section are combined with jurisdictional limitations it
is unsurprising that many, if not most, Internet actors face litigation in only one of two places—the country of their own domicile
or the country of the copyright owner’s domicile; in either place
Internet actors typically face claims raised only under one copyright law—the copyright law of the forum.
CONCLUSIONS
Copyright enforcement on the Internet is challenging. Copyright owners face infringers located in different countries, with varying laws being implicated by infringers’ acts and varying standards and practices of enforcement existing in the countries where
the infringers are domiciled, the places where they act, and the
places where their actions reach (where the content at issue can be
viewed, downloaded, and/or streamed). Enforcement through In258

See Trimble, supra note 1.
Whether such bias exists is a different question; the parties’ concern that such bias
exists or may exist is sufficient to impact the parties’ behavior.
260
See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 (demonstrating that obtaining a
default judgment in a court of specific jurisdiction with a plan to have the judgment
enforced in the country of the defendant’s domicile might not be the best strategy).
259
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ternet service providers who can take down allegedly infringing
content may help copyright owners take swift enforcement action,
but the takedown method is not without pitfalls, particularly in a
cross-border context; for example, the law in the jurisdiction of the
service provider’s domicile might not view the content as infringing, and the filing of a request for a takedown with the service provider may prompt an alleged infringer to file a declaratory judgment action in a jurisdiction that is foreign to the copyright owner.261
A part of the copyright enforcement problem on the Internet is
that countries continue to adhere to the principle of lex loci protectionis for choice of law in copyright cases; the adherence means
that a copyright owner facing a multi-country infringement of his
copyright should file claims under the laws of all those multiple
countries to obtain redress for the infringements in all those countries. Although theoretically a copyright owner can file a lawsuit
under multiple copyright laws (either claims under all the countries’ laws simultaneously in the court of general jurisdiction, or
claims under each country’s law in that country’s courts), practical
limitations discussed in Part III constrain the copyright owner’s
ability to do so. In most cases the copyright owner would probably
select only one country or only a small number of countries in
which and/or for which he would file his claims. The litigation constraints affect the copyright owner’s position in negotiations and in
other extra-judicial enforcement efforts.
The limitations that complicate enforcement for copyright
owners, however, serve Internet actors well, including the Internet
actors who strive to comply with the multiplicity of copyright laws
on the Internet. Because of the inefficiencies caused by the myriad
of conflict of laws rules and approaches that apply to activities on
261

Before filing a request with a foreign service provider, a copyright owner should
consider whether he can and is willing to continue enforcement in a foreign court if the
alleged infringer objects, and whether he can defend his copyright in a potential
declaratory judgment suit that the alleged infringer could bring in a foreign jurisdiction if
the copyright owner’s request creates a ground for personal jurisdiction over the owner in
the foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d
1063 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease and
Desist Letters, DMCA Notifications, and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment
Actions, 50 IDEA 777 (2010).
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the Internet, and because of the practical constraints on crossborder enforcement, Internet actors enjoy some degree of certainty
as to which laws will likely be held to govern their activities.262 Although exceptions will exist, it is most likely, as the analysis in Part
III suggests, that a copyright owner will sue an Internet actor either
in the place of the Internet actor’s domicile or in the place of the
copyright owner’s domicile, and that the copyright owner will
claim infringement under the laws of one of the two countries, depending on where he files suit. Narrowing the number of potentially applicable copyright laws in most cases to two is not an insignificant achievement.263
Discussions about the improvement of conflict-of-laws rules for
IP cases should appreciate the fact that the inefficiencies resulting
from the current myriad of conflict-of-laws rules and approaches
fashion a somewhat workable system for Internet actors. Future
proposals should improve enforcement but not lower the degree of
legal certainty that Internet actors enjoy under the current approaches and rules. The existing conflict-of-laws proposals analyzed in Part II, if adopted, would help copyright owners in their
cross-border enforcement efforts, and in circumstances involving
ubiquitous infringement the proposals would enable worldwide enforcement of copyright in one action filed in a court of general jurisdiction under a single copyright law. The proposals would eliminate most of the costs that copyright owners would otherwise incur
because of the need to ascertain multiple foreign copyright laws,
invoke and/or plead (and in some courts prove) multiple foreign
laws, and engage legal experts for multiple countries.
While making some aspects of enforcement easier, the existing
proposals would not affect many of the practical limitations that
were discussed in Part III. Although the proposals are already helping to increase the awareness of IP lawyers of cross-border issues in
copyright merely by making a wealth of information on the issues
available, it may take time before lawyers and judges become com262

That the certainty is not absolute but exists only as a degree of likelihood should not
be surprising; frequently, “legal certainty” is no more than a lawyer’s best estimate of
likelihood.
263
The number of laws can be narrowed to two only if all countries’ laws identify the
same person or entity as the copyright owner of a particular work.
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fortable with claims of copyright infringements brought under multiple copyright laws. Copyright owners’ public relations costs may
continue to be significant if owners opt for territorially large-scale
enforcement strategies. Most importantly, even assuming the
adoption of the existing proposals copyright owners would still
have to prove infringements in all of the countries in which they
claimed infringements had occurred—if not for the purposes of
identifying the territorial scope of their claims, then for the determination of their remedies. Given that many of the practical limitations would persist even if the proposals were adopted it seems
likely that litigation would remain primarily in the same countries
where cross-border copyright litigation tends to occur today and
that courts would apply in the litigation the same countries’ copyright laws that they do today.
Looking at the multiplicity problem from the point of view of
Internet actors who want to be law abiding when acting on the Internet, we also have to recognize that many Internet actors know
little about the copyright laws of any particular country and make
no attempts to learn about the laws. As they do with other legal issues, many Internet actors rely on their best guess about what is
permissible,264 and when they act on the Internet they assume (just
as they do when they travel to foreign countries) that their best
guess is equally applicable in all countries—perhaps with some
awareness that minor differences among countries could exist. Of
course best guesses are shaped by social norms which, as the Internet proves, can depart from the law; the future will expose the durability of the social norms that developed in the Wild West days of
the Internet.265
264

Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571
(1992) (“Uninformed individuals act based on their best guess about how the law will
apply to their contemplated conduct.”).
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According to a study, 84% of content accessed on the Internet by Spanish users is
pirated. HÉCTOR JIMENEZ. BORJA MARTIN & IÑIGO PALAO, OBSERVATORIO DE PIRATERÍA
Z HÁBITOS DE CONSUMO DE CONTENIDOS DIGITALES 2013, 17, available at
http://lacoalicion.es/wp-content/uploads/Observatorio-pirater%C3%ADa-2013Ejecutivo.9-abril-2014.pdf. According to another study, “15% of the UK population has
engaged in ‘illegal downloading.’” Joe Karaganis & Lennart Renkema, Copy Culture in the
US & Germany, THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY 10 (2013), available at
http://americanassembly.org/sites/default/files/download/publication/copy_culture.pd
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The existing proposals for conflict-of-laws rules for IP disputes
and other ongoing initiatives in this area will contribute to awareness in the legal community about cross-border issues as the issues
arise in the context of IP enforcement, and will also provide an academic foundation for future national and international actions to
improve cross-border enforcement of IP. The solutions that the
proposals seek for infringements on the Internet (also referred to as
ubiquitous infringements) might be the most difficult parts of the
proposals and initiatives to propagate given that countries are currently adhering to the territoriality principle, and given that their
interests lie in having their own laws applied to copyright infringements that occur in their territory. This Article suggests that some
of the concerns that guide countries’ approaches to cross-border
enforcement may be weakening, or at least be subject to debate.
The proposals and initiatives should benefit from the continuing development of technological and business solutions that can
enhance both cross-border access to copyright-protected works and
cross-border enforcement; some of the solutions could make the
adoption of the proposals more palatable. Technological and market solutions will continue to assist copyright owners in addressing
the inefficiencies of enforcement and excesses in transaction
costs.266 Geolocation, content ID (digital watermarks), and the celestial jukebox are among the tools and solutions that can facilitate
easier cross-border transactions in copyright-protected materials.
Technology could also lower litigation costs and make it feasible for
more copyright owners to bring claims that arise in multiple countries in one court, and online access to legal resources and the presentation of evidence in multiple countries will play an important
role in the further internationalization of copyright litigation.

266
See Priest, supra note 32 (discussing examples of extra-legal enforcement measures
facilitated by technological solutions and evolving business models).

